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lately i‘ve been glaring into mirrors
picking myself apart
you‘d think at my age I‘d have thought of
something better to do . . .
but now here‘s this tiny baby
and they say she looks just like me
and she is smiling at me
with that present/infant glee
and I would defend
to the ends of the earth
her perfect right to be1
INTRODUCTION
As an attorney for the losing party in Gonzales v. Carhart,2 I
1

ANI DIFRANCO, Present/Infant, on RED LETTER YEAR (Righteous Babe
Records 2008).
2
127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007) (upholding the federal abortion ban, also known as
the ―Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003‖). In Carhart, the Court upheld a
law that prevents a woman from obtaining the intact D&E method of abortion,
even where the woman‘s doctor believes it is the safest method for her and the
one that best preserves her ability to bear children in the future, and despite the
view of the leading medical association of obstetricians and gynecologists that
intact D&E is the safest procedure for some women. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1644
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also Brief of the American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at
11–16, Gonzalez v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007) (Nos. 05-380, 1382), 2006 WL
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read the opinion with considerable dread. But when I came to the
now infamous passage3 relying on maternal love to support the
Court‘s decision, I stopped and shuddered. Justice Kennedy wrote
for the Court:
Respect for human life finds an ultimate expression in the
bond of love the mother has for her child. The Act
recognizes this reality as well. 4
In response to these words, my own bonds of love—desperate,
animal-like, and imperfect as they are—twanged. Suddenly, our
failure in the Court became more complete; at the same time, these
words shed light on the decision and its irrationality.
The loss in Carhart and the rhetoric the Court employed point
to a significant vulnerability in the movement for legal protections
for women‘s reproductive health care—its conflicts over
motherhood. This Article argues that the movement‘s failure to
emphasize that abortion serves women‘s interest in, and respect
for, motherhood divides it from its constituents and creates the
vulnerability that the anti-abortion movement now exploits,
contributing to the reduction of constitutional protections for
abortion. Embracing abortion‘s supportive relationship to
motherhood is essential to the survival of the abortion right, as well
as to the vitality of our continuing battle to redefine motherhood in
conditions of equality.
In Section I that follows, I explore the ways women‘s respect
for the importance of motherhood and ―bonds of love‖ with their
children inform their decisions to obtain abortions. In Section II, I

2867888 (detailing significant safety advantages of intact D&E over non-intact
D&E alternative).
3
See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Adjudging a Moral Harm to Women from
Abortions, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2007, at A18 (citing passage and noting that
―[i]n his majority opinion, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy suggested that a
pregnant woman who chooses abortion falls away from true womanhood.‖).
4
Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1634 (internal citations omitted). The Court
continued, ―[w]hether to have an abortion requires a difficult and painful moral
decision. While we find no reliable data to measure the phenomenon, it seems
unexceptionable to conclude some women come to regret their choice to abort
the infant life they once created and sustained. Severe depression and loss of
esteem can follow.‖ Id.
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summarize the state of abortion jurisprudence, paying particular
attention to the Court‘s vision of women‘s need for, or ―interest
in,‖ abortion. I trace the emergence of the Court‘s discomfort with
women‘s decision-making about abortion, linking it with
decreasing protections for the right and increasing recognition that
abortion serves an interest in women‘s social and economic
equality. I demonstrate that the Court‘s increasing recognition that
abortion serves an interest in self-determination that could result in
a rejection of the role of mother, accompanied a decreasing
recognition of abortion‘s importance to women‘s interests in
motherhood itself, an interest in how any child they bear is cared
for. This sense in which abortion serves women‘s interests in
motherhood was last seen in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, where
the Court acknowledged that the choice to have an abortion could
be seen as reflecting ―human responsibility and respect for [human
life].‖5
In Section III, I discuss Gonzales v. Carhart and argue that
while the ruling itself is limited and much of the Casey standard
remains intact, the decision reflects this diminishing sense of
abortion as serving the woman‘s interest in motherhood. The
Court‘s opinion reflected a view that abortion destroys
motherhood, rather than the view that abortion enhances
motherhood and enables women to mother their children in the
best conditions possible, and in conditions closer to equality.
Finally, in Section IV I explore resistance in the feminist
movement to stressing the ways abortion serves a woman‘s interest
in, and respect for, the importance of motherhood. Despite real
risks of appealing to and thus supporting regressive notions of
motherhood, I make both normative and prescriptive claims that
given the centrality of concerns for motherhood in women‘s
decision-making about abortion, we must emphasize that women‘s
interest in abortion in a constitutional sense includes not only her
interest in her choice not to be a mother (an aspect of her
decisional autonomy), her interest in her personal dignity, 6 her

5

Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852–53 (1992).
See Reva Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protection: Abortion
Restrictions Under Casey/Carhart, 117 YALE L.J. 1694 (2008) (A ―multi6

S MITH

4/27/2009 7:44 PM

RESPONSIBILITY FOR LIFE

101

interest in her health and life (an aspect of her bodily integrity), 7
and her interest in privacy of the information about her decision, 8
but also includes her interest in motherhood itself and in deciding
how she will mother any child she bears. I contend that these
arguments about why women choose and why women need
abortions can and should be made within, and not as an alternative
to, a rights framework. Stressing that abortion serves women‘s
interest in motherhood in a constitutional sense very clearly falls
within such a framework, and is necessary to drawing a complete

faceted commitment to dignity links Carhart and the Casey decision on which it
centrally relies,‖ that a ―dignity-based analysis of Casey/Carhart offers
principles for determining the constitutionality of woman-protective abortion
restrictions that are grounded in a large body of substantive due process and
equal protection case law,‖ and that ―protecting women can violate women‘s
dignity if protection is based on stereotypical assumptions about women‘s
capacities and women‘s roles, as many of the new woman-protective abortion
restrictions are.‖) [hereinafter The Politics of Protection]; Lawrence v. Texas,
539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003) (holding that liberty right protects the ―dignity‖ of gay
men and lesbians to choose intimate relationships).
7
See Casey, 505 U.S. at 849–50, 857 (―Roe stands at an intersection of two
lines of decisions‖; the Constitution limits interference with ―a person‘s most
basic decisions about family and parenthood‖ and with a person‘s ―bodily
integrity‖); id. at 857 (Roe ―may be seen not only as an exemplar of Griswold
liberty but as a rule . . . of personal autonomy and bodily integrity, with
doctrinal affinity to cases recognizing limits on governmental power to mandate
medical treatment or to bar its rejection.‖); see also Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179,
211–13 (1973) (contrasting ―freedom of choice in the basic decisions of one‘s
life‖ with ―freedom to care for one‘s health and person, freedom from bodily
restraint . . . .‖) (Douglas, J., concurring).
8
See Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S.
747, 766 (1986), (―The decision to terminate a pregnancy is an intensely private
one that must be protected in a way that assures anonymity.‖); id. at 767
(striking Pennsylvania reporting requirements that would have allowed
identification of women who had obtained abortions, thus ―rais[ing] the specter
of public exposure and harassment of women who choose to exercise their
personal, intensely private, right, with their physician, to end a pregnancy‖)
(citations omitted); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 644 (1979) (requiring that
judicial bypass procedures maintain a minor‘s anonymity); cf. Planned
Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 80 (1976) (upholding reporting
requirements that were ―reasonably directed to the preservation of maternal
health and that properly respect a patient‘s confidentiality and privacy‖).
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picture of the importance of abortion to women‘s liberty, equality,
and dignity. It strengthens the woman‘s right to abortion and is
vital to continued protection of the right under any level of scrutiny
or in any constitutional framework.9 The question is whether the
next generation of childbearers is strong enough to assert their
motherliness and control its meaning. I am betting yes.

9

Many have suggested that the right to abortion would be more firmly
protected under a sex equality analysis or a hybrid analysis combining
protections for liberty, equality, and/or dignity. See generally Siegel, The
Politics of Protection, supra note 6, at 1694; Reva B. Siegel, Sex Equality
Arguments for Reproductive Rights: Their Critical Basis and Evolving
Constitutional Expression, 56 EMORY L.J. 815 (2007) (noting commonalities
among sex equality arguments and collecting the literature); Kim Shayo
Buchanan, Lawrence v. Geduldig: Regulating Women’s Sexuality, 56 EMORY
L.J. 1235, 1238 & 1294-1302 (2007) (arguing that Lawrence supports an ―equal
sexual liberty‖ analysis under which men and women have ―equal due process
interests in deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to
sex‖); Jack Balkin, Roe v. Wade: An Engine of Controversy, Judgment of the
Court, and Comment, in WHAT ROE V. WADE SHOULD HAVE SAID 3–27, 37–62,
232–36 (N.Y. Univ. Press 2005); Pamela S. Karlan, Equal Protection, Due
Process, and the Stereoscopic Fourteenth Amendment, 33 MCGEORGE L. REV.
473, 492 (2002) (arguing that ―stereoscopic approach to the fourteenth
Amendment – one in which understandings of liberty and equality inform one
another – may change how courts come to see constitutional issues, and may
lead to fuller and more just answers‖); Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A
Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal
Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261, 263 (1992) (arguing that ―[p]roperly
understood, constitutional limitations on antiabortion laws, like constitutional
limitations on antimiscegenation laws, have moorings in both privacy and equal
protection‖) [hereinafter Reasoning]; Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on
Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281, 1308–24 (1991) (addressing
abortion regulation as issue of sex equality); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some
Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L.
REV. 375, 386 (1985) (arguing that ―the Court‘s Roe position is weakened, . . .
by the opinion‘s concentration on a medically approved autonomy idea, to the
exclusion of a constitutionally based sex-equality perspective‖). Arguments for
protection of the right will be strengthened under any one of these frameworks if
the aspect of abortion that serves women‘s interest in motherhood is
emphasized.

S MITH

4/27/2009 7:44 PM

RESPONSIBILITY FOR LIFE

103

I. THE IMPORTANCE OF MOTHERHOOD AND OTHER REASONS
WOMEN CHOOSE ABORTION
Accurate information about the incidence of abortion and the
reasons women obtain them is central to the public‘s understanding
of abortion and the courts‘ continued protection of the right.
Unfortunately though, few people have accurate information and
misperceptions about these essential facts abound. This section sets
out some basic data on abortion incidence and then reviews data
from recent studies of the reasons women obtain abortions and the
impact of unintended childbearing that reveal the importance of
considerations about parenting in abortion decision-making.
A. Pregnancy and Abortion: the Data10
Nearly half of the approximately six million pregnancies in the
United States each year are unintended. In 2005, 22% of all
pregnancies in the United States, both intended and unintended,
ended in abortion. This equals a rate of 19.4 abortions for every
1,000 women aged 15 to 44 living in the United States. The
abortion rate among women with unintended pregnancies is much
higher, though; a full 40% of these women obtain an abortion. 11 At
current rates,12 and accounting for women who may have more
10

The Centers for Disease Control (CDC) and the Alan Guttmacher
Institute (AGI) are recognized as collecting the best statistical abortion data,
with the CDC recognizing the superiority of the information collected by AGI.
See generally The Limitations of U.S. Statistics on Abortion, ISSUES IN BRIEF
(Alan Guttmacher Inst., New York, N.Y.) (Jan. 1997) (discussing reliability of
different sources of data). Other AGI publications include exhaustive reviews of
many of the best studies. HEATHER D. BOONSTRA ET AL., ABORTION IN
WOMEN‘S LIVES 38–44 (Alan Guttmacher Inst. 2006).
11
Rachel K. Jones, Mia R.S. Zolna, Stanley K. Henshaw, Lawrence B.
Finer, Abortion in the United States: Incidence and Access to Services, 2005, 40
PERSP. ON SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 6, 9 (2008). BOONSTRA, supra note 10,
at 8.
12
Abortion rates began to decline in the 1990s, after remaining steady for
most of the 1980s. Lawrence B. Finer & Stanley K. Henshaw, Abortion
Incidence and Services in the United States in 2000, 35 PERSP. ON SEXUAL &
REPROD. HEALTH 6, 6 (2003) [hereinafter Incidence 2000]. Though a dispute
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than one abortion, more than one-third of American women will
have had an abortion by the time they turn forty-five. 13 As this
number reflects, facing an unintended pregnancy or an intended
pregnancy gone wrong and choosing an abortion is much more
likely to occur in the course of a woman‘s lifetime than many
would like to believe.
In the United States, approximately 88% of abortions are
obtained before thirteen weeks of pregnancy, as measured from the
first day of the woman‘s last menstrual period (LMP).14

rages about the causes of the decline, see also id. at 6–7 (discussing possible
causes of decline), evidence from abroad, as well as the disparity in the rate of
abortion in unintended versus intended pregnancies here in the United States,
suggests that abortion rates will decline when the rate of unintended pregnancies
declines. See BOONSTRA, supra note 10, at 10. For example, the abortion rate in
the Netherlands is less than half of the U.S. rate despite that abortion in the
Netherlands is free, legal and widely available. Id. In contrast, the highest rates
of abortion occur in countries in which abortion is severely restricted by the law,
and contraceptive use is socially unacceptable. Id. (reporting abortion rate of 50
per 1,000 in Peru, and 47 per 1,000 in the Dominican Republic).
13
See LAWRENCE B. FINER & STANLEY K. HENSHAR, ESTIMATES OF U.S.
ABORTION INCIDENCE, 2001–2003 (Alan Guttmacher Inst. 2006) [hereinafter
Incidence 2001–2003]; Incidence 2000, supra note 12.
14
E.g., Abortion Surveillance – United States, 2004, MORBIDITY AND
MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT: SURVEILLANCE SUMMARIES (Ctr. for Disease
Control, Atlanta, Ga.), Nov. 23, 2007 at 16 (Table 1). A note on terminology
here. When a doctor discusses a woman‘s pregnancy with her, the doctor refers
to gestational age of a pregnancy as dated from the first day of the woman‘s last
menstrual period (―LMP‖). Doctors use this dating because although pregnancy
usually occurs approximately fourteen days after LMP, ovulation can occur at a
different point in the cycle, making LMP the only sure date. If you think of
yourself as fourteen weeks pregnant, conception probably occurred about twelve
weeks ago. The alternative dating would be ―as measured from conception.‖
Unless there is a reference to dating being done from conception, dating is most
likely being done from LMP.
I raise this detail because it can easily be manipulated. Lawyers for women
and their doctors opposing abortion regulations have always used LMP dating.
They use it because doctors and most federal reports on abortion use it. See, e.g.,
David A. Grimes, The Continuing Need for Late Abortions, 280 J. AM. MED.
ASS‘N 747, 747 (1998) [hereinafter Continuing Need] (explaining federal use of
LMP dating). They use it because the public thinks of pregnancy this way, and
because they believe using any other dating would mislead the public. See, e.g.,
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Approximately 5.5% take place after fifteen weeks LMP, 15 and of
these only approximately 1.4% occur at twenty-one weeks or
beyond. 16 Federal reports do not further break down the category
of abortions occurring at twenty-one weeks or beyond to determine
how many women obtain abortions in the third trimester, because
reports are inaccurate and often include pregnancy terminations
done for fetal demise. 17 One researcher reported in 1998 that the
only published article on third trimester abortions examined
abortions in Georgia at twenty-five or more weeks in 1979 and
1980 and reported only three cases out of approximately 70,000
induced abortions; two procedures were performed for fetal
anencephaly (the lack of a forebrain), and insufficient information
was available for the third.18
Over 60% of women obtaining abortions already have children.
One study found that 61% of the women had children; with 34%
having two or more children. 19 Another smaller study found that
nearly 75% had children, nearly half with two or more. 20 Almost a
quarter (23%) of women under the age of twenty terminating their
pregnancies have at least one child. 21 The proportion of women
seeking abortions who already have children has increased over the

id. Others use conception dates, usually because they want to give the
impression that something occurs two weeks earlier than it does. See, e.g.,
Unborn Child Pain Awareness Act of 2006, H.R. 6099, 109th Cong. § 2(1)
(2006) (claiming that fetus has structures to feel pain ―20 weeks after
fertilization,‖ which actually refers to twenty-two weeks of pregnancy LMP).
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
Continuing Need, supra note 14, at 747–48.
18
Id. at 748 (citing Alison M. Spitz et al., Third-Trimester Induced
Abortion in Georgia, 1979 and 1980, 73 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 594. (1983)).
19
Rachel Jones et al., Patterns in the socioeconomic characteristics of
women obtaining abortions in 2000-2001, 34 PERSP. ON SEXUAL & REPROD.
HEALTH 226, 228 (2002) [hereinafter Socioeconomic Characteristics].
20
Rachel K. Jones et al., “I Would Want to Give My Child, Like,
Everything in the World”: How Issues of Motherhood Influence Women Who
Have Abortions, 29 J. OF FAMILY ISSUES 79, 86 (2008) [hereinafter Issues of
Motherhood].
21
Socioeconomic Characteristics, supra note 19, at 230.
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years from 44% in 1983 and 55% in 1994 to the present levels. 22
Overall, adolescents and lower-income women are more likely
than older, wealthier women to have abortions in the secondtrimester.23 While these groups are overrepresented, women
obtaining second trimester abortions come from every conceivable
demographic: rich and poor and middle-income; old and young
and in between; Catholic, those who identify as ―born-again,‖
Buddhist, atheist, etc.; ―pro-choice‖ and ―pro-life.‖24
B. Why Women Have Abortions
Two new studies of the reasons women have abortions come to
interesting conclusions about the role of motherhood in women‘s
decision-making processes. 25 Not surprisingly, both studies report
that the decision to have an abortion at any time in pregnancy is
motivated by a number of different overlapping factors,26 the most
22

Stanley Henshaw et al., Abortion patients in 1994-95: Characteristics
and contraceptive use, 28 FAM. PLAN PERSP. 140 (1996).
23
Lawrence B. Finer et al., Timing of Steps and Reasons for Delays in
Obtaining Abortions in the United States, 74 CONTRACEPTION 334, 335 (2006)
[hereinafter Reasons for Delay].
24
Rachel K. Jones, et al., Patterns in the Socioeconomic Characteristics of
Women Obtaining Abortions in 2000-2001, 34 PERSP. ON SEXUAL & REPROD.
HEALTH 226, 229–32, (2002); Brief of the Inst. for Reprod. Health Access &
Fifty-Two Clinics & Orgs. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 21 n.30,
Gonzales v. Carhart 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007) (Nos. 05-1382, 05-380) [hereinafter
Brief of IRHA]. The ―pro-life‖ category surprises some, but physicians often
hear, ―I am pro-life, but [my, my daughter‘s, wife‘s, sister‘s, parishioner‘s] case
is different.‖ The protester/patient dynamic is not uncommon. Physicians report
treating protesters, or members of the protester‘s family. See, e.g., SUSAN
WICKLUND, THIS COMMON SECRET: MY JOURNEY AS AN ABORTION DOCTOR
178–84 (Public Affairs 2007).
25
Lawrence B. Finer et al., Reasons U.S. Women Have Abortions:
Quantitative and Qualitative Perspectives, 37 PERSP. ON SEXUAL & REPROD.
HEALTH 110, 117-18 (2005) [hereinafter Reasons U.S. Women Have Abortions];
Issues of Motherhood, supra note 20, at 79.
26
Reasons U.S. Women Have Abortions, supra note 25, at 112–13; Issues
of Motherhood, supra note 20, at 84 (―[M]otherhood issues and responsibilities
for other children are often related to other issues, such as financial difficulties
and the lack of a steady . . . partner. Thus, not just motherhood but broader
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common of which were ―I can‘t afford a baby now‖ (73%)27 and
―having a baby would dramatically change my life‖ (74%).28
Forty-eight percent cited relationship problems or a desire to avoid
single motherhood. Forty percent had completed their
childbearing. One-third of women were not ready to have a child.
Another 13% cited concerns about the health of the fetus and 12%
cited concerns about their own health. 29 These reasons are the
same as those cited in earlier studies.
When women were questioned about what was behind these
general categories, though, concerns about their ability to nurture a
child (or another child) both financially and emotionally emerged
as a consistent theme. 30 As one study reports:
More than half of the respondents indicated that their
abortion decisions were influenced by the perceived
disadvantages—material and abstract—that the future
children would experience if they were to carry the
pregnancies to term. Many of the respondents expressed the
idea that children are entitled to conditions such as stable
and loving families, financial security, and a high level of
care and attention. Because the women were unable to
provide these things at this time, they were not in a position
to have a child (or another child). 31
While many women expressed their desire to avoid single

parenting and relationship issues play a role in many women‘s decisions to
abort.‖).
27
Reasons U.S. Women Have Abortions, supra note 25, at 112. This
number breaks down into women who stated that having a child would disrupt
education (38%) or work (35%), and those who said it would hurt their other
children (32%). Id. at 113.
28
Id. at 112. This number breaks down in those who were unmarried
(42%), those who are students (34%), those who can‘t afford the basic needs of
life (23%) and those who were unemployed (22%). Id. at 113.
29
Id. at 113.
30
Issues of Motherhood, supra note 20, at 84; see also Reasons U.S.
Women Have Abortions, supra note 25, at 117 (―[M]ost women in every
[category] cited concern for or responsibility to other individuals as a factor in
their decision to have an abortion.‖).
31
Issues of Motherhood, supra note 20, at 91.
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parenting, they also expressed a desire to be ready to be the sole
provider for their children if it became necessary as a way to avoid
some of the most acute problems of single parenting, especially
poverty. As one woman who did not yet have children stated, ―I
really do want a baby someday. I want to be able to support my
child and give it everything it needs, and I don‘t want to depend on
anyone else for it.‖32
Women who had children ―spoke of the responsibilities they
were shouldering, and many discussed their desires to provide a
better home for their existing children and the children whom they
might have in the future.‖33 They hoped that ―terminating the
current pregnancies would help them achieve better lives for the
children they already had.‖34 Women who had not yet had children
were aware of the responsibilities of motherhood, and they did not
want to have a baby before they felt able to properly fulfill these
duties. 35 As one respondent explained, ―I can‘t have a newborn
baby and not be able to take care of it, and I would want to give
my child, like, everything in the world . . . I don‘t think that [my
partner and I are], like, mentally ready.‖ 36
Even women‘s concerns about personal health were themselves
often expressed in terms of their responsibility for others. 37 One
32

Id.
Id. at 95.
34
Id. at 96.
35
Id. at 95.
36
Id. at 91.
37
By raising the specter of women making decisions that take others into
account, especially here where those others are their children, I risk being
accused of essentialism. See Peggy Cooper Davis & Carol Gilligan, A Woman
Decides: Justice O’Connor and Due Process Rights Of Choice, 32 MCGEORGE
L. REV. 895, 897 (2001) (noting that ―the title of Gilligan‘s In a Different Voice
has caused a confusing oversimplification of Gilligan‘s basic ideas‖); Pamela
Karlan & Daniel Ortiz, In a Diffident Voice: Relational Feminism, Abortion
Rights, and the Feminist Legal Agenda, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 858, 871 (1993)
(discussing the dangers of relational feminism and essentialism); see also
NANCY CHODOROW, THE REPRODUCTION OF MOTHERING : PSYCHOANALYSIS
AND THE SOCIOLOGY OF GENDER 150, 166–67 (1978). CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A
DIFFERENT VOICE 1–2 (2d ed. 1993). But the fact that some women in some
conditions will make decisions by taking others into account, as reported in
33
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study reports that women ―revealed how health concerns are linked
to the concept of responsibility: some women saw the physical
burden of pregnancy and its associated health conditions as
threatening their ability to fulfill responsibility to dependents . . .
[and saw another child as threatening] the economic security of
their children.‖38
Studies show a significant increase in the percentage of women
having abortions because they already have other children
depending on them, from 19% in 1987 to 32% in 2004. Thus, it
appears that these concerns about the importance of providing a
positive nurturing environment for your children ―play an
increasingly salient role in women‘s abortion decisions.‖ 39
C. Special Reasons Women Have Abortions in the Second
Trimester
The underlying reasons that women choose abortions in the
second-trimester are the same as they are in the first, but there are
additional factors that have delayed their choice. These additional
factors can be divided into three major categories, some of which
are well understood, others of which are more complex. The
categories are: (1) medical factors, including fetal anomalies and
maternal health conditions that are diagnosed or worsen after the
first trimester; (2) problems that delay discovery of pregnancy until
the second-trimester; and (3) obstacles that delay access to
abortion, especially financial limitations and problems finding
these two new studies, does not mean that I am claiming: 1) that all women
make decisions this way; 2) that women would make decisions this way in
conditions of ―nature‖ or in conditions of equality, whether considered ―natural‖
or ―unnatural‖; 3) that ―relational‖ decision-making is in fact more common
among women than men, or 4) that men, if faced with these same decisions,
wouldn‘t also make decisions taking their families into account. Indeed, in a
recent brief to the U.S. Supreme Court recounting the stories of women
obtaining second trimester abortions, to the extent women reported on men who
were involved in their decision-making process, men generally had the same
considerations as the women. Brief of IRHA at 10–12, 22–23, Gonzales v.
Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007) (No. 05-380).
38
Reasons U.S. Women Have Abortions, supra note 25, at 117–18.
39
Issues of Motherhood, supra note 20, at 84.
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physicians who will provide abortions. 40 A much smaller group of
women have difficulty deciding whether or not to carry the
pregnancy to term or experience a change in their personal
circumstances in the second-trimester, such as with a relationship
or employment.
1. Medical Factors, Including Fetal Anomalies, and Women’s
Health Conditions
As noted above,41 13% of women seeking abortions seek them
because they are concerned about fetal health, and 12% because
they are concerned about their own health. 42 In the second
trimester, the percentage of women citing fetal health concerns
rises to 21%,43 probably because many fetal anomalies are not
diagnosed and confirmed until the second-trimester. The
percentage of women citing personal health concerns remains
fairly constant at 10%.44
Women’s Health and Lives: Overall during the twentieth
century as medical treatments improved, our ability to treat the
40

Ironically, many abortion regulations that are allegedly intended to
convince women not to obtain an abortion, such as mandatory delay laws, or
that are intended just to limit access to abortions altogether, actually push many
women into the second-trimester of pregnancy, increasing the numbers of the
least-favored and medically riskier abortions. To the delight of some, these types
of restrictions also prevent some women from obtaining abortions altogether.
See Michael J. New, The I’s Have It: Three cheers for pro-life incrementalism,
NATIONAL REVIEW ONLINE, April 19, 2007, http://article.nationalreview.com
/?q=MTZlYzNmY2M4OTFhMjAzNWI4OGYwMDAyMjViZGI5NjA=#more
(describing debate since 1970s).
41
See supra text accompanying note 29.
42
Reasons U.S. Women Have Abortions, supra note 25, at 116 (Table 6),
117.
43
Id., supra note 25, at 116 (Table 6).
44
Id. Logically, women with preexisting health conditions advising against
pregnancy altogether would terminate earlier in pregnancy; a second category of
women whose health does not become problematic until the second trimester
would terminate later. Many of the women in this second category are carrying
wanted pregnancies and have often delayed as long as possible while doctors
confirm an original bad diagnosis, or while their own health condition
deteriorates, waiting and hoping that they can carry the pregnancy to term.
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complications of pregnancy improved as well. As a result, the
overall risk of death from pregnancy decreased from 850 per
100,000 in 1900 to approximately 7 to 8 women per 100,000 in
1982.45 Progress stopped there however and mortality rates in the
United States actually went up between 1991 and 1999. By 1999,
13.2 women per 100,000 died during pregnancy. The increase may
be caused by the increase in pregnancy among women over thirtyfive who have a greater risk for pregnancy-related illness. In terms
of mortality, twenty-one per 100,000 women aged thirty-five to
thirty-nine, and forty-five per 100,000 women aged forty and over,
die each year from a pregnancy-related illness.46 The leading
causes of pregnancy-related death were embolism (20%),
hemorrhage (17%), and pregnancy-induced hypertension (16%).47
In addition, an alarming disparity in the risk for pregnancyrelated death exists between African-American women and white
women. Overall, mortality ratios (deaths per 100,000 live births)
for African-American women are 3 to 4 times higher than for
white women. In other words, 30 out of every 100,000 AfricanAmerican women, compared with 8 out of every 100,000 white
women, die from a pregnancy-related illness each year.48 The
mortality rates and the racial disparities only increase as women
age. At ages thirty-five to thirty-nine, seventy per 100,000 AfricanAmerican women—versus less than 20 per 100,000 white
women—die from a pregnancy-related illness each year.49 For
women forty and over, the numbers skyrocket, with 160 per
100,000 African-American women versus approximately 30 per
100,000 white women dying from a pregnancy-related illness each
year, a ratio 5.5 times higher for African-Americans.50
The risks of morbidities—complications during pregnancy
45

Jeani Chang et al., Pregnancy-Related Mortality Surveillance – United
States, 1991-1999, 52 CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION
MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT NO. SS-2 at 2 (CDC, Feb. 21,
2003).
46
Id.
47
Id. at 4–5.
48
Id. at 2–3 & Table 1.
49
Id. at Figure 2.
50
Id.
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which do not result in death—also increase dramatically for
women over 35. Twelve out of 100 pregnant women over thirtyfive are hospitalized for obstetrical complications prior to
delivery. 51
Pregnancy can impact a woman‘s health in three ways. First,
women can develop conditions specific to pregnancy, such as
hypertensive disorders,52 hemorrhage,53 hypovolemic shock54 and
disseminated intravascular coagulation, 55 and preterm birth,56 all of
which can place the lives and health of women at significant risk.
One of the most serious is preeclampsia, a hypertensive disorder
involving rapidly increasing blood pressure that puts the woman at
risk of deterioration of function in a number of organs and systems
and, eventually, eclampsia, which involves seizures, coma, and in
51

Trude A. Bennett et al., Pregnancy-Associated Hospitalizations in
United States in 1991 and 1992, 178 AM. J. OBSTET. GYNEC. 346, 348 (1998).
52
F. GARY CUNNINGHAM, ET AL., WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS 693–744 (20th
ed. 1997) (describing complications associated with hypertensive disorders, such
as preeclampsia and eclampsia) [hereinafter WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS].
53
Id. at 745–82 (―Even though the maternal mortality rate has been reduced
dramatically by hospitalization for delivery and the availability of blood from
transfusion, death from hemorrhage remains prominent in the majority of
mortality reports.‖).
54
―Hypovolemic shock is an emergency condition in which severe blood
and fluid loss makes the heart unable to pump enough blood to the body.‖
Hypovolemic shock in MEDLINE PLUS MEDICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA, available at
http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/000167.htm#Definition;
WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS, supra note 52, at 783–96 (―Despite the availability of
modern blood-banking techniques, hemorrhage leading to hypovolemic shock
remains a significant cause of maternal mortality in obstetrics.‖).
55
―Disseminated intravascular coagulation (DIC) is a serious disorder in
which the proteins that control blood clotting become abnormally active.‖
Medline Plus Medical Encyclopedia: Disseminated intravascular coagulation,
available
at
http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/000573.htm
#Definition. DIC can lead to ―temporary hemophilia.‖ WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS,
supra note 52, at 787–96. Small blood clots form within, and can clog up, the
blood vessels, cutting off blood supply to various organs such as the liver or
kidney. These organs will then stop functioning. The clotting proteins of the
blood become ―used up‖ by the clots, leaving the patient at risk for serious
internal bleeding or bleeding from minor cuts and bruises. Id. It too can be
deadly.
56
WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS, supra note 52, at 797–826.
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some cases death.57 When moderate or severe preeclampsia does
not improve after hospitalization, ―delivery is usually advisable for
the welfare of both mother and fetus.‖58 The condition usually does
not develop until after twenty weeks‘ gestation, and many women
attempt to continue the pregnancy until well after viability to give
their baby the best chance of survival. 59
Another very serious pregnancy-related condition is
chorioamnionitis, or infection of the uterine lining, which can
develop from premature rupture of the membranes. Again, the
fetus must be delivered and the infection treated so that the woman
does not develop sepsis, an infection of her blood which can be
fatal. It too is not likely to develop before the second trimester. 60
Second, there are conditions that can happen to anyone, but
that are more likely to occur in pregnant women. For example, the
likelihood of thromboembolism—blood clots in the lower
extremities that can lead to pulmonary embolism (blood clots in
the lungs)—in a normal pregnancy and the period immediately
after childbirth ―is increased by a factor of five when compared
with nonpregnant women of similar age.‖ 61 As a leading textbook
reports, ―venous thrombosis and pulmonary embolism remain a
major cause of maternal death in the United States.‖62 Moreover,
some fetal anomalies, including non-immune hydrops and fetal
ascites, 63 are known to lead to serious maternal pregnancy
57

Id. at 702
Id. at 717.
59
Id. at 716–17; see also STEVEN GABBE, JENNIFER NIEBYL, JOE LEIGH
SIMPSON, OBSTETRICS: NORMAL AND PROBLEM PREGNANCIES (4th ed. 2001)
[hereinafter NORMAL AND PROBLEM PREGNANCIES].
60
WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS, supra note 52, at 657–58; id. at 328–29 (noting
that ―if delivery is delayed for 24 hours or more after membrane rupture, there is
increasing likelihood of serious intrauterine infection‖).
61
Id. at 1112.
62
Id.
63
Non-immune hydrops, or ―hydrops fetalis,‖ is a serious condition in
which abnormal amounts of fluid build up in two or more body areas of a fetus
or newborn. Hydrops fetalis in MEDLINE PLUS MEDICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA,
available
at
http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/007308.htm
#Definition. Fetal ascites similarly involves an abnormal accumulation of fluid
in the peritoneal cavity, causing abdominal swelling. See WILLIAMS
58
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complications. 64
Finally, pregnancy can worsen a condition in a woman already
unhealthy in some respect. For example, the blood volume of a
pregnant woman at or near term averages about 40 to 45% above
nonpregnant levels, and in some women, can be nearly double
nonpregnant levels. 65 The pregnant woman‘s heart rate increases to
pump this additional blood, taxing the cardiovascular system. As a
result, a woman with any sort of heart or vascular condition,
whether known or unknown, is at increased risk during
pregnancy66 and may be advised to terminate depending on her
prognosis. 67 Overall, heart disease complicates about 1% of
pregnancies.68
Similarly, pregnancy poses additional risks to women with, or
at risk of, diabetes, the most common medical complication of
pregnancy. The dramatic hormonal changes of pregnancy can
make it difficult for a woman with preexisting diabetes to control
her blood sugars, and clinical diabetes may appear in some women
only during pregnancy. Women with pre-existing diabetes and
women with gestational diabetes are at risk of seizures or diabetic
coma if the woman‘s blood sugars are not controlled.
These cardiovascular or endocrine system conditions will
worsen as pregnancy progresses,69 as will the conditions of women
with many other diseases, including some with diseases of the
nervous system, some women with epilepsy, liver diseases, and
certain cancers. Often, complications from preexisting conditions
do not arise until the second trimester of pregnancy, or their

OBSTETRICS, supra note 52, at 456–57.
64
See, e.g., WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS, supra note 52, at 995 (noting that
maternal complications due to carrying a fetus with non-immune hydrops
include an increased incidence of preeclampsia, preterm labor, and postpartum
hemorrhage).
65
Id. at 201.
66
See generally Chapter 47: Cardiovascular Diseases, in WILLIAMS
OBSTETRICS, supra note 52, 1079–1101.
67
WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS, supra note 52, 1083.
68
Id. at 1079.
69
See generally Section X: Common Complications of Pregnancy, in
WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS, supra note 52, at 693–894.
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severity is tolerable until then. 70 As David Grimes, M.D.,71 points
out, the availability of abortion is pronatalist in the sense that some
women, especially some in this last category, would not become
pregnant and try to carry to term if abortion were not available to
ensure that they could terminate the pregnancy if a problem does
arise. 72
Fetal Anomalies: There are hundreds of fetal anomalies that
are either lethal or would result in a child with significant
morbidity. Among these conditions are Trisomy 13 and 18, which
are often fatal chromosomal anomalies;73 neural-tube defects,
including anencephaly, a lethal disorder characterized by the
absence of the cranium74 and open spina bifida, in which parts of
the neural system are outside of the body;75 conjoined twins;

70

See, e.g., Brief of IRHA at 14–15, Gonzales v. Carhart 127 S. Ct. 1610
(2007) (Nos. 05-1382, 05-380) (quoting statement from pregnant woman with
lupus and a statement from pregnant woman with placenta previa (a placenta
covering the birth canal which puts the woman at risk of massive hemorrhaging)
who developed preeclampsia (high blood pressure of 220 over 135) and kidney
problems creating a significant risk of stroke and seizure).
71
David A. Grimes, M.D., is a well-known and highly respected
obstetrician/gynecologist, who has had a dual career in clinical ob/gyn and
preventive medicine for the past three decades. David A. Grimes, M.D.,
http://davidagrimes.com/index.html. Dr. Grimes currently serves as Clinical
Professor in the Department of Obstetrics and Gynecology at the University of
North Carolina School of Medicine, and Vice President of Biomedical Affairs at
Family Health International. He also serves on the editorial boards of several
prominent medical journals, including The Lancet, Obstetrics and Gynecology,
Obstetrical and Gynecological Survey, and Contraception and has received
numerous honors and awards for his research, teaching, and clinical work. He
has served as an epidemiologist at the Centers for Disease Control for nine
years, and a faculty member in four medical schools: Emory University,
University of Southern California, University of California-San Francisco, and
University of North Carolina. Id.
72
Continuing Need, supra note 14, at 749.
73
Nearly 50% of infants born with Trisomy 13 die in the first month, and
relatively few survive past three years of age. NORMAL AND PROBLEM
PREGNANCIES, supra note 59, at 141. Trisomy 18 is often detected in stillborn
infants and mean survival rates are in the months. Id. at 142.
74
WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS, supra note 52, at 907–08.
75
Id.
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congenital heart disease;76 congenital diaphragmatic hernia;77
genetic neurological disorders with progressive psycho-motor
deterioration, such as Tay-Sachs and Canavan‘s diseases;78 and
Potter‘s syndrome (or renal agenesis), in which the kidneys fail to
develop. 79 Women generally do not detect these anomalies until
the second trimester.
Structural fetal anomalies, such as renal agenesis, anencephaly,
and skeletal dysplasia, are typically not detected until the woman
has her routine ultrasound, which usually takes place at around
eighteen weeks LMP. Chromosomal fetal anomalies are typically
not detected until the second trimester because amniocentesis, the
most common test for genetic chromosomal anomalies, cannot be
performed accurately before about fifteen to sixteen weeks LMP
and the results are not available until at least one week afterward,
well into the second trimester.80 Even though a new screening test
can be performed earlier in pregnancy, it is only useful to identify
a limited subset of abnormalities identifiable by amniocentesis. 81
76

Id. at 908.
There is a high incidence of associated severe malformations or
chromosomal anomalies with diaphragmatic hernia contributing to a high
perinatal mortality rate and to the approximately 75% rate of death of affected
fetuses or neonates; ―uncomplicated‖ diaphragmatic hernia is fatal in
approximately 45% of the cases. Id. at 911–12.
78
See National-Tay Sachs & Allied Diseases Association website,
http://www.ntsad.org/. Tay-Sachs disease is a progressive neurological genetic
disorder in which development slows and the infant gradually regresses,
eventually becoming blind, mentally retarded, paralyzed, and non-responsive to
his or her environment. Canavan‘s disease begins with visual inattentiveness or
an inability to perform motor tasks at around three to nine months, is evidenced
by overall low muscle tone and lack of head control, a deterioration of motor
skills and mental functioning, seizures and feeding problems. Many children
with Canavan disease die in infancy, though some survive into adolescence and
even occasionally into adulthood.
79
See, e.g., NORMAL AND PROBLEM PREGNANCIES, supra note 59, 909–10
(noting that one-third of infants with renal agenesis are stillborn and the longest
reported survival is 48 hours); Brief of IRHA at 7–8, Gonzales v. Carhart 127 S.
Ct. 1610 (2007) (Nos. 05-1382, 05-380).
80
See generally Prenatal Genetic Diagnosis, in NORMAL AND PROBLEM
PREGNANCIES, supra note 59, at 152–83.
81
NORMAL AND PROBLEM PREGNANCIES, supra note 59, at 155–58.
77
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Moreover, women who are at low risk for fetal anomalies often
do not have routine amniocentesis because of the risks that
accompany the test. In those cases, chromosomal anomalies are
sometimes suspected only after a routine ultrasound has been
performed at approximately eighteen weeks LMP. When that
occurs, amniocentesis to confirm suspected anomalies may not be
performed until well after eighteen weeks LMP.
In describing their decision-making processes in these tragic
cases, ―[w]omen repeatedly state that one of the main reasons they
choose to terminate wanted pregnancies is that the information
they learn in the second trimester confirms, if the fetus were to
survive, its life would be short and fraught with pain.‖82 As the
amicus brief filed by the Institute for Reproductive Health Access
in Planned Parenthood v. Gonzales reported, one woman
interviewed whose baby had ―Cat-Eye Syndrome‖83 explained,
―[w]e made this decision because we loved our daughter so much.
We didn‘t want her to suffer the definite and the untold problems
she was sure to endure, if she even made it . . . . We fought for her.
We wanted her. But we didn‘t want to condem[n] her to [a] life of
agony.‖84 Another married woman and mother of a three-year-old
described similar concern for her son:
So all the fluid was shown on the brain [and] stomach and
[the physician] believed the baby had a very severe case of
heart defect. And most likely—90% chance that he was
going to die in utero . . . . And even the 10% that he was
going to be born he wasn‘t going to live very far without, I

82

Brief of IRHA at 11, Gonzales v. Carhart 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007) (Nos.
05-1382, 05-380).
83
Trisomy 22, or ―cat eye‖ syndrome, is a chromosomal disorder in which
there are three copies of chromosome 22 rather than two. The most common
association of symptoms include a hole in or absence of tissue from the iris,
obstructions of the anus, and renal abnormalities such as missing or
underdeveloped kidneys and cardiac defects. See, e.g., Rosias PR et al.,
Phenotypic variability of the cat eye syndrome: Case report and review of the
literature, 12 GENETIC COUNSELING 272-82 (2003) (noting that cat eye
syndrome is characterized by large phenotypic variability), abstract available at
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/11693792.
84
Brief of IRHA at 11.
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mean, even with major interventions it was very unlikely
that he was going to survive . . . . [S]o at the time, we made
a decision to terminate because I couldn‘t—knowing the
outcome of what was going to happen I just couldn‘t carry
on. I mean why put the baby through suffering if I can end
his life and set him free of his suffering that he had to
endure. That was our thinking. 85
After diagnosis, understandably some women and their
families need time to decide what to do. Another woman reported:
It took me an agonizing week to make this heartbreaking
choice, but in the end I know it was the best decision for
me, my family and most importantly, our child. We lost our
oldest son at 6 years and 10 months old to complications
from having a rare type of dwarfism. That dwarfism was
exactly the reason why we had the CVS test done. We
knew without a doubt that we could never in good
conscience bring another child into this world with that
disease . . . . Most genetic defects come with their own list
of extra problems, which I didn‘t take into account, and put
that child at risk for painful procedures and even death. No
child deserves to come into a world of pain. That is what
made my decision for me . . . .86
2. Delay in Obtaining Abortions
Two recent studies found that most women who obtain
abortions in the second trimester, other than those obtaining
abortions because of maternal or fetal health conditions, either did
not know they were pregnant until the second trimester or had
difficulty obtaining insurance coverage and raising funds to pay for
the procedure.87 Other delays were caused by government

85

Id.
Id. at 10–11.
87
Reasons for Delay, supra note 23, at 2; Eleanor Drey et al., Risk Factors
Associated with Presenting for Abortion in the Second Trimester, 107
OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 128, 132 (Table 3) (2006) (hereinafter Risk
Factors); see also The Continuing Need, supra note 14, at 748.
86
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restrictions on abortion that made access difficult or by emotional
issues that delayed an ultimate decision.88
Problems Suspecting and Confirming Pregnancy: On
television and even in fairy tales, women wake up and vomit, or
find their pants getting tight and—voila!—they realize they are
pregnant. Both the Risk Factors and Reasons for Delay studies
show however, that many women obtaining abortions in the second
trimester had only recently discovered they were pregnant.89 The
simple fact is that for many women, pregnancy is not obvious.
Consider also that, as one study showed, more than two-thirds of
the women having abortions in the second trimester had been using
contraception when they became pregnant, creating a false sense of
security. 90
Some women are unaware of the correlation between a missed
period and pregnancy. 91 For others, such as women with irregular
periods, women on certain forms of birth control, or those
experiencing periods of stress or illness, the correlation does not
even exist—a missed period is nothing out of the ordinary. 92 One
woman explained:
I was unemployed and had no health insurance . . . . I had
no doctor, I had no gynecologist and was just trying to get a
job so that I could support myself and take care of my
immediate needs. So my health was very secondary. Also,
88

Id.
Id. at 9–10 (reporting that 36% of the women who were delayed took a
long time to find out about the pregnancy and that this was the third most
common reason for delay); Risk Factors, supra note 87, at 130 & 132 (Table 3)
(reporting that approximately 34% of the women who obtained second trimester
abortions did not realize they were pregnant until well into the pregnancy).
90
Risk Factors, supra note 87, at 130 & 131 Table 1.
91
Reasons for Delay, supra note 23, at 9–10 (reporting that minors took a
week longer than all other age groups to suspect pregnancy, that both minors
and older teens took longer than average time to confirm pregnancies with a test,
and discussing one adolescent who had missed her period for a few months but
did not know this could be a pregnancy indication).
92
Over one-half of respondents who took longer to suspect pregnancy had
irregular periods prior to this pregnancy because of having had a baby or a
miscarriage within the last six months and/or using an injectable contraceptive.
Id. at 10.
89
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because of my personal health history it was normal for me
to not menstruate for extended periods of time . . .
especially when . . . I‘m feeling stressed . . . . So because of
those factors I just wasn‘t aware of what had happened. 93
Another woman had a similar story:
I had an IUD inserted in early November, and I was told
that it was common for women to stop menstruating. I
conceived a week after my IUD was inserted, despite using
condoms as a back-up method. I wasn‘t even aware I was
pregnant until the end of January, and even then, I only
took a test out of paranoia . . . . The risks from an IUD
pregnancy, coupled with our financial situation led us to
make the decision for abortion. It was too soon for us to
have another child. My daughter is still just an infant, and
deserves all our love and attention. 94
Other women‘s bodies will mask the signs of pregnancy; they
will lose weight or continue to menstruate throughout the first
trimester.95 This can fool those who know the signs of pregnancy
and even women who have been pregnant before. One woman I
knew told me that while she was writing her Ph.D. dissertation and
caring for her first child, she was under an extreme amount of
stress, financially strapped and losing weight, not gaining. She
finally missed a period, which she attributed to stress, and only
went to the doctor because she was tired all the time and thought
perhaps she was anemic because of the weight loss. She was
shocked to find out she was twenty-two weeks pregnant.
Dr. Grimes points out that women, especially young teenagers
or women with mental handicaps, who have become pregnant by
rape or incest and did not receive medical attention 96 may not
93

Brief for IRHA at 20–21, Gonzales v. Carhart 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007)
(Nos. 05-1382, 05-380).
94
Id. at 19.
95
Risk Factors, supra note 87, at 134 (stating that ―many women seeking
second-trimester abortions simply lacked pregnancy symptoms or were unaware
of their last menstrual period‖).
96
Half of all rape victims receive no medical attention. Continuing Need,
supra note 14, at 749 (citing Melissa M. Holmes et al., Rape-related pregnancy:
Estimates and descriptive characteristics from a national sample of women, 175
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discover they are pregnant until they are in their secondtrimester.97 Thirty-two thousand pregnancies result from rape each
year and one-third of these women do not discover their
pregnancies until the second-trimester.
Financial and Other Logistical Barriers: Financial and other
logistical barriers caused many women to delay their abortions
significantly. 98 According to Reasons for Delay, the most common
cause of delay was financial. Of the second-trimester abortion
patients who would have preferred to have their abortions earlier,
36% reported that they needed additional time to raise money or
obtain insurance coverage. The study reports that some women had
made and cancelled multiple appointments ―because they didn‘t
have enough money to cover the procedure and one woman said
that she had waited an entire month for her Medicaid coverage to
become active.‖99 Moreover, the price for the abortion often
increases while women delay the procedure in an attempt to gather
funds. The increase in costs can then cause further delays. A single
mother of two reported:
I was trying to get the money up but the longer you wait the
more it is. Then I‘m Rh negative so you have to pay for the
shot. And it‘s just more and more. It builds up to the point
where—what if I didn‘t have it today and it was $1500 in a
week? And then it was almost $2000 . . . .100

AMER. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 320, 320–25(1996)).
97
Continuing Need, supra note 14, at 749; see also Brief for IRHA at 21
n.28, Gonzales v. Carhart 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007) (Nos. 05-1382, 05-380) (―He
forced his way into my door into my living room and raped me on my living
room floor . . . I . . . got the pregnancy test. And it was so positive . . . . And I
cried for days.‖).
98
Reasons for Delay, supra note 23, at 15 & Table 1; see also, e.g., Stanley
K. Henshaw & Lynn S. Wallisch, Medicaid Cutoff and Abortion Servs. For the
Poor, 16 FAMILY PLANNING PERSEPCTIVES 170, 170 (1984) (finding that lowincome women on average delay accessing abortion an additional two to three
weeks because of difficulties in obtaining funds).
99
Id. at 15.
100
Brief for IRHA at 18, Gonzales v. Carhart 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007) (Nos.
05-1382, 05-380).
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Financial factors were less significant in the Risk Factors study
which examined a population in California, probably because
California is one of seventeen states that provides coverage for
abortions in its Medicaid program. 101 Even in this study, however,
women obtaining abortions in the second-trimester were more
likely than women obtaining abortions in the first trimester to
report difficulty obtaining insurance coverage from private insurers
as well as from the state‘s Medicaid program as a delaying
factor.102
Additional logistical factors also cause significant delays for
some women. In one study, an initial referral to a medical facility
that could not perform that abortion ―was the single most
frequently reported delay causing factor by second-trimester
patients.‖103 One woman explained the problems she encountered
finding an abortion provider:
Once I realized and accepted I was pregnant, I made my
appointment at Planned Parenthood of Idaho and was 5
days past the deadline. I was 14 weeks. Scared but being
responsible I took a seven hour bus drive to Salt Lake City

101

The federal government and thirty-three states refuse to provide public
funding for medically necessary abortions. GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE: STATE
POLICIES IN BRIEF, STATE FUNDING OF ABORTION UNDER MEDICAID (2009),
available at http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_SFAM.pdf.
102
Risk Factors, supra note 87, at 134. Seventy-four percent of women pay
―out-of-pocket‖ for abortion procedures, and four states restrict private insurers
from providing coverage except in cases that would endanger a woman‘s life if
carried to term. See GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF,
RESTRICTING INS. COVERAGE OF ABORTION 1 (2006).
103
Risk Factors, supra note 87, at 130 (Table 3) (47% of women seeking
second trimester abortions cited referral to another clinic as a factor causing
delay); see also Reasons for Delay, supra note 23, at 13 (11% of women who
were delayed had been to another clinic before finding the facility; these women
took over twice as long on average to obtain the abortion). In 2000, abortion
providers operated in only 13% of counties and three non-metropolitan areas in
the United States. Incidence 2000, supra note 12, at 10–11. Only 33% of
providers offer abortion services at twenty weeks gestation and 24% provide
services at twenty-one weeks. Stanley K. Henshaw & Lawrence B. Finer,
Accessibility of Abortion Servs. in the U.S. 2001, 35 PERSP. ON SEXUAL &
REPROD. HEALTH 16, 18 (2003).
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and was turned away again because I was 7 days past 18
weeks (which increases by $500). I therefore had to
leave . . . . I am currently at [a clinic in Oregon] . . . . I am
21 weeks [pregnant].104
Other Legal Restrictions on Abortion: In addition to bans on
Medicaid funding for abortion and the subsequent desperate hunt
for the funds to pay for abortion, other government-imposed
restrictions on abortion can also delay abortions into the second
trimester. For example, one study found that Mississippi‘s
mandatory delay law, which requires a woman to make two inperson visits to a clinic prior to obtaining the abortion, was
independently associated with delays in obtaining an abortion. 105
After implementation, the study found that ―the proportion of
second-trimester procedures increased by 53% (from 7.5% of
abortions to 11.5%)‖ among women whose closest provider was
in-state and subject to the law.106 Parental involvement laws can
also push young women into the second trimester because they are
afraid to involve their parents, and it can take a significant amount
of time to navigate judicial bypass systems and wait for court
orders. Some young women even delay their abortions until they
turn eighteen. 107
104

Brief for IRHA at 18–19, Gonzales v. Carhart 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007)
(Nos. 05-1382, 05-380).
105
See Ted Joyce & Robert Kaestner, The Impact of Mississippi’s
Mandatory Delay Law on the Timing of Abortion, 32 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 4
(2000) (hereinafter Impact of Mandatory Delay); see also A Woman‘s ChoiceEast Side Women‘s Clinic v. Newman, 132 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1159–60 (S.D.
Ind. 2001) (Enforcement of the Indiana waiting period law‘s provision ―which
effectively requires two trips to an abortion clinic,‖ was likely to prevent
approximately 10 to 13 % of the women in Indiana—1300 to 1700 women—
who would otherwise obtain abortions from obtaining them and cause a
significant increase in the proportion of second trimester abortions, which are
both riskier and more expensive than earlier abortions, not because of any
―persuasive effect‖ of the law, but instead because of ―the burdens that the ‗in
the presence‘ requirement would impose on women.‖), rev’d on other grounds,
305 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2002).
106
Impact of Mandatory Delay, supra note 105, at 4.
107
Ted Joyce et al., Changes in Abortions and Births and the Texas
Parental Notification Law, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1031, 1036 (2006); Brief for
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Decision-making and Emotional Difficulties: In Reasons for
Delay, Finer reports that 50% of the second-trimester patients who
would have preferred to have their abortions earlier ultimately took
a long time to decide whether to have an abortion. Thirty-three
percent of these women reported that it was a difficult decision to
make; 18% were worried about the cost; 15% reported it ―took
time‖ to talk to their husband/partner; and 15% had ―religious or
moral‖ concerns. 108 Nine percent of women were waiting for their
relationship with their husband/partner to change, and 9% were
afraid to tell their husband/partner or parents they were
pregnant.109 Similarly, Risk Factors reports that women cited
similar factors causing delay such as difficulty deciding (57%),
being ―in denial‖ that they were pregnant (54%), being sad or
depressed (67%), and fear to have the abortion (79%), but these
factors were the same among second-trimester and first-trimester
patients.110
D. The Impact of Unintended Childbearing
Studies show that women are correct in assessing the risks to
themselves and to their children of unintended childbearing.
Unhealthy behaviors and postpartum depression are more
prevalent among mothers with unintended births than among those
with intended or mistimed births, and these behaviors and a
mother‘s mental health status can have a significant impact on
children.111
IRHA at 20 n.25, Gonzales v. Carhart 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007) (Nos. 05-1382,
05-380); see also Patricia Donovan, Judging Teenagers: How Minors Fare
When They Seek Court-Authorized Abortions, 15 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 259 (1983).
108
Reasons for Delay, supra note 23, at Table 1.
109
Id.
110
Risk Factors, supra note 87, at 131.
111
See, e.g., Diana Cheng, Eleanor B. Scharz, Erika Douglas & Isabelle
Horon, Unintended Pregnancy and Associated Maternal Preconception,
Prenatal and Postpartum Behaviors, -- CONTRACEPTION --- (2008) (accepted
article in press; on file with the Journal of Law and Policy) (hereinafter
Unintended Pregnancy); Jennifer S. Barber, William G. Axinn & Arland
Thornton, Unwanted Childbearing, Health, and Mother-Child Relationships, 40
J. HEALTH & SOC‘L BEHAVIOR 231, 249 (1999) (hereinafter Mother-Child
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For example, even after controlling for socio-demographic
factors, one recent study found that women with unwanted or
mistimed pregnancies were more than two times as likely to smoke
during the last 3 months of pregnancy—and presumably
throughout pregnancy because it is unlikely that women would
start smoking while they are pregnant 112—were more than twice as
likely to report inadequate daily consumption of folic acid, 113 and
were more likely to delay initiation of prenatal care until after the
first trimester.114 While many mothers with unintended births
attempt to practice healthy behaviors such as initiation of breast
feeding,115 the study reports that ―the more challenging [healthy]
behaviors, such as continuing breastfeeding for 8 weeks‘ duration
and smoking cessation, were less prevalent among women with
[unintended pregnancies] than among women with intended or
mistimed ones.‖116 Moreover, studies have found ―strong evidence
that mothers who reported [unintended childbearing] have worse
mental health in terms of self-reported depression and happiness‖
and that ―[t]hese associations between having [unintended] births
and [poor] mental health are quite strong.‖117

Relationships); see also generally THE BEST INTENTIONS: UNINTENDED
PREGNANCY AND THE WELL-BEING OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES (Sarah Brown
and Leon Eisenberg, eds., National Academies Press - INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE
REPORT 1995) (hereinafter INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE REPORT).
112
Unintended Pregnancy, supra note 111, at 2; INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE
REPORT, supra note 111, at 68–70.
113
Unintended Pregnancy, supra note 111 at 3.
114
Id.
115
Id. at 3–4 (also noting that these women were as likely as mothers with
intended births to place their infants to sleep on their backs and use postpartum
contraception).
116
Id. at 4.
117
Mother-Child Relationships, supra note 111, at 249; see also
Unintended Pregnancy, supra note 112, at 4 (finding ―women with unwanted
births were nearly twice as likely to report feeling depressed during the
postpartum period as women with intended births‖); id. (noting that study results
confirmed the results of previous studies which also found higher levels of
depression among mothers with unwanted births); INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE
REPORT, supra note 111, at 75.
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Postpartum depression is a concern not only for the mother but
also for her child. Postpartum depression ―has been shown to result
in poor mother-infant interactions and subsequent behavioral and
cognitive difficulties for the child.‖ 118 Specifically, ―mothers who
had [unintended births] spent significantly less leisure time outside
of the home with their children,‖ 119 and spank or slap their children
more often than other mothers. 120 While these ―findings roughly
parallel research on interaction between depressed mothers and
their infants‖ which shows that ―depressed mothers interact either
aggressively (e.g., physical punishment) or in a withdrawn manner
(e.g., spend less leisure time) with their infants,‖ 121 the incidence
of withdrawn or aggressive behavior of mothers with unwanted
childbearing towards their children does not correlate completely
with their mental health status.122 In other words, while poor
mental health status ―may exacerbate the relationship between
unwanted childbearing and lower quality mother-child
interactions,‖ it does not account for it entirely. 123
Not surprisingly, these poor parent child relationships that can
develop from unwanted childbearing ―impede[] the [child‘s]
socialization process, [which] . . . may have implications for many
other dimensions of well-being, even into adulthood.124 For
example, the socialization process ―has been linked to a variety of
important social outcomes such as educational attainment,
occupational attainment, personality, child development, selfesteem and marital relationships.‖ 125 Unintended childbearing and
these poor parent-child relationships that develop continue to affect
the way the mother-child relationship develops into adulthood;

118

Unintended Pregnancy, supra note 111, at 4 (citations omitted).
Mother-Child Relationships, supra note 111, at 250.
120
Id.
121
Id.
122
Id. at 250–51 (finding that ―mother‘s mental health . . . did not mediate
the relationship between unwanted childbearing and physical punishment or . . .
leisure time activities‖).
123
Id. at 251.
124
Id. at 253.
125
Id. (internal citations omitted).
119
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mothers with more births than they wanted give less social support
to their adult children.126
In conclusion, unintended childbearing ―leads to outcomes that
are problematic for both mothers and their children, including
mental health problems for mothers, lower quality relationships
between mothers and children in terms of affection and social
support, and increased violence and less leisure time interaction
during childhood.‖127 Many women who choose abortion are
choosing to decrease the likelihood that these outcomes will
become reality for them and their children. They are choosing
abortion in the interest of motherhood.128
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL ABORTION BALANCE: VALUING
WOMEN‘S INTERESTS IN ABORTION
Given the extensive evidence that supports what many women
have long known, that women have abortions because they feel
responsible for any life they bring into the world, and because they
care about how any child they bear—if they are to bear one—will
be mothered, the question is how has this aspect of abortion been

126

Id. at 246.
Id. at 253.
128
Pregnancy intention may even have an impact on physical maternal and
birth outcomes, as a recent study examining the relationship between a woman‘s
pregnancy intention and physical maternal and birth outcomes found. A.P.
Mohallajee, K. M. Curtis, B. Morrow, & P.A. Marchbanks, Pregnancy Intention
and Its Relationship to Birth and Maternal Outcomes, 109 Obstetrics &
Gynecology 678 (2007) (noting that ―[a] handful of studies have documented
associations between pregnancy intention and other outcomes, such as
depression, physical abuse, and postpartum depression, but research focused
specifically on the relationship between unintended pregnancy and maternal
outcomes is limited‖); INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE REPORT, supra note 111, at 70–
72 (finding association between unintended childbearing and low birthweight
and infant mortality). One recent study reported that although research on the
issue is limited, the results support the view that ―pregnancy intention may be an
indicator for increased risk of poor outcomes, including low birth weight,
preterm delivery and premature rupture of the membranes.‖ Id.; but see MotherChild Relationships, supra note 111, at 249 (finding that poor ―physical health is
not significantly related to having unwanted births‖).
127
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treated in abortion jurisprudence. The answer is that it is given
short shrift. To the extent the Court has recognized this aspect of
the decision, and it has, its recognition is fading. It is time for the
courts to confront this reality and to consider its importance to
generations of women. Without recognition that abortion serves
women‘s interest in motherhood, in addition to the other important
interests it serves, women‘s interests will continue to be
undervalued in the constitutional equation.
Like the other constitutional standards—intermediate scrutiny,
rational basis, rational basis with bite—the strict scrutiny standard
applied in Roe set up a kind of equation by which the Court weighs
the individual‘s interest at stake in the protected right on the one
hand against the state‘s interest in regulation on the other hand. 129
This latter side, the ―tell me why‖ side, as in ―tell me why you get
to restrict my right,‖ is where most of the analysis is conducted
under strict scrutiny. The Court asks if the state‘s ―interest‖ in the
regulation of the right is strong enough to outweigh the
individual‘s interest in his or her right, and if so, whether and how
well the regulation actually serves the asserted interest—whether it
―fits.‖ As the jurisprudence evolved away from strict scrutiny, less
and less of a ―fit‖ analysis was conducted by the Court. Much of
this evolution involved a strengthening of the state‘s power to
regulate on behalf of potential fetal life and a diminishing view of
the importance of the right to abortion to women.
A. Women’s Interests in Roe
On the ―tell me why‖ side in Roe, the Court held that there
were two ―legitimate and important‖ state interests that could
sometimes be ―compelling‖ enough to justify restrictions on
abortion: the state‘s interest ―in preserving and protecting the
health of the pregnant woman‖ and its interest ―in protecting the
potentiality of human life.‖130 In weighing the woman‘s interests
129

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162–63 (1973) (weighing interests).
Id. at 162–63 (Each of the state interests are ―separate and distinct. Each
grows in substantiality as the woman approaches term and, at a point during
pregnancy, each becomes ‗compelling.‘‖); see also id. at 162–65 (―[U]ntil the
end of the first trimester mortality in abortion may be less than mortality in
130
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against the state‘s justifications, the Court determined that the
validity of a given restriction on abortion must be evaluated in
light of the changing nature of pregnancy, its risks and
complications at different stages as compared to the risks and
complications of abortion procedures at these different stages, and
the developmental stages of fertilized egg, embryo, previable and
finally viable fetus.131 Taking these different aspects of pregnancy
and fetal development into account, the Court announced the
infamous trimester framework according to which restrictions on
abortion were to be evaluated.132
The Roe133 decision has been criticized for, among other
things, 134 its scanty explication of the importance of abortion to
normal childbirth‖ and that ―[w]ith respect to the State‘s important and
legitimate interest in potential life, the ―compelling‖ point is at viability. This is
so because the fetus then presumably has the capability of meaningful life
outside the mother‘s womb. State regulation protective of fetal life after viability
thus has both logical and biological justifications.‖).
131
See, e.g., id. at 162–65 (noting that ―until the end of the first trimester
mortality in abortion may be less than mortality in normal childbirth‖ and that
―[w]ith respect to the State‘s important and legitimate interest in potential life,
the ―compelling‖ point is at viability. This is so because the fetus then
presumably has the capability of meaningful life outside the mother‘s womb.
State regulation protective of fetal life after viability thus has both logical and
biological justifications.‖).
132
Under the trimester framework, in the period before the fetus is viable,
the government could restrict abortion only to serve the state‘s interest in
protecting women‘s health; after viability however, the government could go so
far as to prohibit abortion to protect potential life, as long as those laws made
exceptions to permit abortion when necessary to protect a woman‘s health or
life. Id. at 162–63. For all the criticism of the trimester framework set out in
Roe, a trimester system recognized a fact still true thirty-five years later—that
the level of medical complexity of abortion procedures, the level of risk
associated with pregnancy, and important facts of fetal development all
correspond closely with the transitions from trimester to trimester.
133
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
134
Roe is often criticized, indeed scoffed at, for basing the right to abortion
on a privacy right found in the ―penumbras‖ and ―shadows‖ of the Bill of
Rights. However, it was Griswold, not Roe, that relied on a right to privacy
found in the ―penumbras‖ and ―shadows‖ of the many provisions of the Bill of
Rights. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965). In Roe, the
Court cited only the due process liberty right and the Ninth Amendment‘s
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women‘s liberty135 and explanation of its determination that the
right to abortion was a ―fundamental‖ one. 136 The Roe Court failed
to discuss the evidence that demonstrated how enforcement
through law of traditional gender roles in the family created

reservation of rights to the people as possible bases for the privacy right,
abandoning the penumbra argument, though it had been raised by the plaintiffs,
and instead settling on the liberty right in the end. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153. Part of
the confusion about penumbras may have stemmed from the Court‘s use of the
privacy right as an intermediary between the due process liberty right and the
right to abortion itself. Perhaps the doctrinal basis for the right would have been
more readily accepted had the Court adopted Justice Stewart‘s concurring
analysis, which expounded on the Court‘s decision and advocated that the right
to abortion should have been grounded directly in the liberty right without the
intermediary ―right to privacy.‖ Id. at 168 (Stewart, J., concurring) (―In a
Constitution for a free people, there can be no doubt that the meaning of
‗liberty‘ must be broad indeed . . . . The Constitution nowhere mentions a
specific right of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life, but the
‗liberty‘ protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
covers more than those freedoms explicitly named in the Bill of Rights.‖)
(internal citations omitted). I suspect that the criticism would have flowed in any
case, but one target of attack would have been removed. Regardless, the
argument is irrelevant today. In Casey, the Court seems to have followed Justice
Stewart‘s advice, grounding the right directly in the due process liberty right.
See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851–53 (1992).
135
In Roe, the Court held that abortion was a ―fundamental‖ right, 410 U.S.
at 155, protected by the liberty guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment‘s Due
Process Clause. Id. at 153 (noting that whether the right to privacy is founded in
the ―Fourteenth Amendment‘s concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon
state action‖ as ―we feel it is‖ or in the Ninth Amendment‘s reservation of rights
to the people, it is ―broad enough to include abortion‖) (emphasis added).
136
See, e.g., Reasoning, supra note 9, at 274. (―Because Roe and its
progeny treat pregnancy as a physiological problem, they obscure the extent to
which the community that would regulate a woman‘s reproductive choices is in
fact implicated in them, responsible for defining motherhood in ways that
impose material deprivations and dignitary injuries on those who perform its
work.‖); Laurence H. Tribe, Foreword: Toward a Model of Roles in the Due
Process of Life and Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1, 7 (1973) (―One of the most
curious things about Roe is that, behind its own verbal smokescreen, the
substantive judgment on which it rests is nowhere to be found.‖); id. at 17
(―[T]he Court never adequately explains [why] ‗the liberty involved is accorded
a far more stringent protection, so stringent that a desire to preserve the fetus‘s
existence is unable to overcome it.‘‖) (internal citations omitted).
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conditions of inequality. It referred to the mental and physical
harm caused by pregnancy, but failed to detail the ways and the
frequency with which pregnancy can threaten women‘s health and
lives. The Court failed to discuss the deaths and injuries caused by
illegal abortions and the political uprising of thousands of women
and men, and especially physicians and clergy, who joined the
movement to secure access to safe abortion in the face of the
tragedies of the time,137 and the Court often referred to the right as
one belonging to the physician rather than the woman herself. 138
However, the language of Roe does support the view that the
Court recognized that women‘s liberty—or freedom, equality,
dignity, humanity—depends on their freedom in public and
freedom in private, at work and at home, as citizen and as mother,
and recognized that the abortion right was essential to liberty in
both aspects of women‘s lives. To the extent the Court focused on
the women obtaining abortions, it recognized that some sought to
avoid maternity altogether while others sought to create the best
circumstances for any children to whom they did give birth. In
recognizing the risk to both physical and mental health posed by
pregnancy and childcare, the Court noted that ―[m]aternity, or
additional offspring, may force upon the woman a distressful life

137

See, e.g., ARLENE CARMEN AND HOWARD MOODY, ABORTION
COUNSELING AND SOCIAL CHANGE: FROM ILLEGAL ACT TO MEDICAL PRACTICE;
THE STORY OF THE CLERGY CONSULTATION SERVICE ON ABORTION (Valley
Forge: Judson Press, 1973); LAURA KAPLAN, THE STORY OF JANE: THE
LEGENDARY UNDERGROUND FEMINIST ABORTION SERVICE (Univ. Chicago
Press 1997); KRISTIN LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD
(Univ. of Cal. Press 1985).
138
See Roe, 410 U.S. at 163 (―For the period prior to the point at which the
state‘s interest in potential life becomes compelling, the attending physician, in
consultation with his patient, is free to determine, without regulation by the
State, that, in his medical judgment, the patient‘s pregnancy should be
terminated. If that decision is reached, the judgment may be effectuated by an
abortion free of interference by the State.‖) (emphasis added); id. at 164 (―For
the stage prior to approximately the end of the first trimester, the abortion
decision and its effectuation must be left to the medical judgment of the pregnant
woman’s attending physician.‖) (emphasis added); id. at 166 (―[T]he abortion
decision in all its aspects is inherently, and primarily, a medical decision, and
basic responsibility for it must rest with the physician.‖) (emphasis added).
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and future,‖ and expressed concern about the woman‘s ability,
―psychologically and otherwise,‖ to care for a child. 139 The Court
recognized the ―problem of bringing a child into a family already
unable, psychologically and otherwise, to care for it.‖140 In other
words, the Court acknowledged that women sometimes obtain
abortions because of their sense of responsibility to care for
children to whom they ―give‖ birth.
In recognizing the aspect of abortion that enables women to set
the terms of their motherhood, the Court was responding to the
arguments of the political movement for women‘s liberation and
equality in the background of Roe. As Reva Siegel and Robert Post
have meticulously detailed, the women‘s movement of the time
sought women‘s equality in both of the so-called ―separate‖
spheres of work and family, demanding legal abortion as one
required component of the whole. In the ―Women‘s Strike for
Equality,‖ a one day strike organized by feminists and held on
August 26, 1970 in approximately forty cities across the country,
the movement‘s demand for ―Equality Now‖ included demands for
childcare and abortion, as well as education and employment.141
Part of choosing to decide whether to bear a child, the movement
recognized, included considering issues related to one‘s family

139

Id. at 153.
Id.; see also id. at 170 (Stewart, J., concurring) (recognizing ―the
interests of a woman in giving of her physical and emotional self during
pregnancy and the interests that will be affected throughout her life by the birth
and raising of a child are of a far greater degree of significance and personal
intimacy than the right to send a child to private school protected in Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), or the right to teach a foreign language
protected in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).‖) (internal quotations
omitted).
141
Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and
Section Five Power: Policentric Interpretation of the Family and Medical Leave
Act, 112 YALE L.J. 1943, 1988–91 (2003) (arguing that ―for the second-wave
feminist movement, women‘s emancipation required fundamental changes in the
structure of family life‖); id. at 1991 (claiming that ―[i]n demanding ‗Equal
Rights Now‘ in childcare and abortion, as well as in education and employment,
the strike emphasized that women would no secure equal citizenship with men
until family life was organized on terms that presupposed the equal participation
of both its adult members in public life‖).
140
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life—how (in the world) that child would be reared if born—as
well as issues related to one‘s public life—jobs and education.
Similarly, amicus briefs in Roe argued that women‘s
constitutional rights were infringed not only when they were
forced ―to be child breeders,‖ but also when they were forced to be
child ―rearers against their will,‖142 and when they were forced
―into the intolerable dilemma of choosing between what in many
instances would be a totally irresponsible act of bearing and
casting off‖ or raising an unwanted child. 143 The attorneys tied
women‘s unequal status at home—their disproportionate ―domestic
responsibilities‖—to their inequality at work.144 They drew a
connection between the restrictions on the woman caused by
pregnancy and the restrictions on the woman caused by
parenting.145 Abortion was essential to the adjustment from
inequality to equality.
B. Women’s Interests in Casey
In Casey, the Court‘s view of the interests that the abortion
right serves shifted, and for the first time the Court explicitly
acknowledged that abortion serves women‘s interests in equality in
her public life. 146 The Court rejected (somewhat grudgingly) 147 the
142

Brief for New Women Lawyers et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Appellants at 7, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (emphasis added).
143
Id. at 13; see also id. at 19.
144
As one amicus brief put it ―restrictions on a woman‘s liberty and
property only begin with pregnancy.‖ Id. at 19–20. A woman who had to restrict
the hours she was available to work outside the home to late afternoon and night
shifts so that she could care for her children during the day was generally
considered ―unavailable for work‖ and thus not entitled to unemployment
compensation. Id. (citing Lukienchuk v. Administrator, Unemp. Comp. Act, 176
A.2d 892, 23 Conn. Supp. 85 (Super. Ct., 1961)). The brief also noted that the
only Connecticut case at the time in which the Court held that a woman who
restricted her availability for ―personal reasons‖ was still entitled to
unemployment compensation involved a woman who had seven children. Id.
(quoting Carani v. Danaher, 13 Conn. Supp. 109 (Super. Ct., 1943)).
145
Id. at 26–27 (arguing that women carry burdens far beyond
childbearing); id. at 41 (discussing the trauma of giving up a child for adoption).
146
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 856 (1992) (―The ability of
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State‘s right to impose on the woman ―its own vision of the
woman‘s role,‖ that is motherhood itself, ―however dominant that
vision has been in the course of our history and our culture.‖
Although this ―equality talk‖ in Casey has been properly lauded, it
was accompanied by a decrease, not an increase, in the level of
protection for abortion from strict scrutiny to the undue burden
standard.
A clue to this decreasing protection for abortion can be seen in
the Casey Court‘s fascinating discussion of the woman‘s interest in
autonomous decision-making that accompanied the equality talk.
For the first time, the Court expressed real discomfort with the
decision to have an abortion—discomfort that was behind the
downgrading of the abortion right and that foreshadows the
Carhart Court‘s mother-love idolatry and difficulty with abortion
decision-making expressed in the ―bonds of love‖ paragraph. For
example, in exploring the woman‘s right to self-determination—
the right to decide whether or not to be a mother—the Court first
boldly stated that ―[a]t the heart of liberty is the right to define
one‘s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and
of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not
define the attributes of personhood were they formed under
compulsion of the State.‖148 However, while this aspect of the
abortion decision provided the basis for the Court‘s generous view
of human fulfillment in Lawrence v. Texas,149 in the context of
abortion it provides the Court little comfort. The Court writes,
―[t]hese considerations begin our analysis of the woman‘s interest
women to participate equally in the economic and social life of the Nation has
been facilitated by their ability to control their reproductive lives.‖) (citation
omitted).
147
I say grudgingly because the only reasons given for not imposing on the
woman the state‘s vision of her role was that ―[t]he mother who carries a child
to full term is subject to anxieties, to physical constraints, to pain that only she
must bear.‖ Id. at 852.
148
Id. at 851.
149
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003) (―Freedom extends
beyond spatial bounds. Liberty presumes an autonomy of self that includes
freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct. The instant
case involves liberty of the person both in its spatial and in its more transcendent
dimensions.‖).
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in terminating her pregnancy but cannot end it,‖ because
―[a]bortion is a unique act,‖ an act ―fraught with consequences for
others,‖ including the woman ―who must live with‖ her decision,
her ―spouse, family, and society‖ who must live with the
knowledge that abortions take place, and ―depending on one‘s
beliefs, for the life or potential life that is aborted.‖150 Almost
sorrowfully the Court continues, writing that although ―these
sacrifices [of childbearing and child rearing] have from the
beginning of the human race been endured by woman with a pride
that ennobles her in the eyes of others and gives to the infant a
bond of love,‖ this cannot ―alone‖ be grounds for the state to insist
she make the sacrifice. 151 In other words, while acknowledging
that the woman has a right to decide not to be a mother, to decide
not to make the sacrifice, the Court expresses its wish that the
woman would make the sacrifice after all and reminds her how
―ennobled‖ she would be if she were to do so.
Notably, the Court then continues by exploring aspects of the
abortion decision-making process that it viewed as ―of the same
character as the decision to use contraception, to which Griswold v.
Connecticut, Eisenstadt v. Baird, and Carey v. Population Services
International afford constitutional protection.‖152 The Court
recognized that some women choose abortion because of their
sense of ―responsibility and respect‖ for the life they are creating,
and because they view ―the inability to provide for the nurture and
care of the infant [as] a cruelty to the child and an anguish to the
parent.‖153 These views are ―intimate views with infinite
variations, and their deep, personal character underlay [the
Court‘s] decisions in Griswold, Eisenstadt, and Carey. The same
concerns are present when the woman confronts the reality that,
perhaps despite her attempts to avoid it, she has become
pregnant.‖154 The Court was clearly more comfortable with this
aspect of abortion and has ―no doubt as to the correctness of‖

150
151
152
153
154

Casey, 505 U.S. at 852.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 853.
Id.
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Griswold, et al., which ―support the reasoning in Roe relating to
the woman‘s liberty because they involve personal decisions
concerning not only the meaning of procreation but also human
responsibility and respect for it.‖155
While the Court in Casey recognized, and was much more
comfortable with, the woman who chose abortion because of her
sense of ―responsibility and respect‖ for her offspring—her
concern about nurturing and caring for any child she would
create—it seems to lose sight of this woman. The decision reads as
if the woman who chooses abortion is not making a positive choice
reflecting her sense of responsibility for any life she would create;
rather, in Casey, the choice is the ―fraught‖ choice. As such, it
draws from Justice White‘s earlier characterization of the abortion
right as ―a negative one,‖ the lesser of two evils. 156 As Justice
White saw it, the right in Roe was ―based not on the notion that
abortion is a good in itself, but only on the view that the legitimate
goals that may be served by state coercion of private choices
regarding abortion are, at least under some circumstances,
outweighed by the damage to individual autonomy and privacy
that such coercion entails. In other words, the evil of abortion does
not justify the evil of forbidding it.‖157
Given what we have learned since Casey, how close the Court
was at the time to overruling the right to abortion entirely, and how
hard the right was for Justice Kennedy to stomach, 158 this
incorporation of negative views and diminished recognition of the
positive aspects of abortion is perhaps not surprising. As the
original members of the Roe majority left the Court and were
replaced by those who personally opposed abortions, a more
negative view of the right and the resulting diminished protections
were perhaps inevitable.
However, the shift in focus reflected in Casey was also part of
a larger shift occurring in the pro-choice movement as the
155

Id. at 852–53 (emphasis added).
Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S.
747, 797 (1986) (White, J., dissenting).
157
Id.
158
See LINDA GREENHOUSE, BECOMING JUSTICE BLACKMUN: HARRY
BLACKMUN‘S SUPREME COURT JOURNEY 182–206 (Henry Holt & Co., 2005).
156
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movement, and especially the issue of abortion, found itself
increasingly segregated from other issues of women‘s equality and
liberation.159 To the extent they addressed larger movement issues,
the briefs of Planned Parenthood and the amici in Casey focused
on the impact of abortion on women‘s economic equality, the gains
women had made in the labor force because of their access to
abortion,160 and the importance of abortion to women‘s health.161
Restrictive abortion laws, they argued, deprived women of basic
control over their lives—of the freedoms of ―spirit and selfdetermination‖—because of the impact of parenthood on a
woman‘s ability to participate in the marketplace. 162 Gone was any
link of the right to abortion to responsible parenting or to equality
in family life, and gone was a sense of the importance of equality
in parenting at home to women‘s equality, liberty, humanity, or
dignity.
The briefs do acknowledge that many women who have
abortions go on to have children. For example, the briefs credit a
woman‘s ability to control the ―timing and spacing of her children‖
with allowing women to ―continue their education, enter the
workforce and otherwise make meaningful decisions consistent

159

Reva Siegel has described how ―[a]s countermobilization against ERA
and Roe converged, leadership of the women‘s movement struggled to defend
ERA and Roe by separating them, over time engaging in ever more strenuous
efforts of self-censorship.‖ Reva Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social
Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change: The Case of the De Facto ERA,
94 CAL. L. REV. 1323, 1397 (2006).
160
See Brief of Petitioners and Cross-Respondents at 33–34, n.65, Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (No. 91-744), 1992 WL 12006398
(noting the increase in women‘s labor force representation and diminution in the
wage gap between men and women).
161
See also id. at 31–32 (―Roe’s guarantee of safe, legal abortion has been
of profound importance to the lives, health, and equality of American women,‖
because it ―allowed millions of women to escape the dangers of illegal abortion
and forced pregnancy,‖ and because ―the nationwide legalization of abortion
following Roe resulted in dramatic advances in the safety of abortion, and, as a
consequence, there were substantial decreases in the total number of abortionrelated deaths and complications.‖).
162
Id. at 26–27 (focusing on parenthood‘s impact on ―a woman‘s
educational prospects, employment opportunities, and self determination‖).
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with their own moral choices.‖ 163 The focus of the briefs can also
be understood as a product of the time, and can be credited with
reaching three potentially anti-Roe Justices with arguments about
the importance of abortion in women‘s lives. But the briefs reflect
the view that the ultimate prize served by abortion is the freedom
to be educated and work in conditions of equality, unencumbered
by one‘s children, and do not discuss the additional ways in which
abortion serves the goal of gaining the freedom to raise children
and to mother them in conditions of equality.
III. LESSONS FROM GONZALES V. CARHART: A LIMITED BUT
DANGEROUS DECISION
In Gonzales v. Carhart,164 the Court upheld the federal
―Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003‖ (―the Act‖), reversing
course from Stenberg v. Carhart,165 a decision issued just seven
years before. Although I have criticized 166 the 5 to 4 decision
163

Id. at 33 & n.65 (noting that there has been ―a substantial increase in
women‘s labor force representation and a diminution in the wage gap between
men and women‖ since Roe).
164
Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007).
165
Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000). In Stenberg, the Court struck
down a Nebraska law banning so-called ―partial-birth abortion‖ that was nearly
identical to the later-enacted federal ban. First, the Court held that Nebraska‘s
law was so broadly worded that it would have banned D&E abortions, which
account for approximately 90% of all second-trimester abortions, and not just
intact D&E abortions as Nebraska claimed. Id. at 938–45. Second, the Court
held that even if the law were narrowly construed to ban only ―intact D&E,‖ the
ban would be unconstitutional because a ―significant body of medical opinion
. . . supports the proposition that banning‖ intact D&E ―could endanger
women‘s health.‖ Id. at 938 (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 879 (1992)).
166
See Postings of Priscilla J. Smith to Balkinization blog,
http://balkin.blogspot.com/search?q=priscilla+Smith+and+carhart (April 26,
2007, 15:23 EST); id. (May 9, 2007, 12:18 EST), available at
http://balkin.blogspot.com/search?q=priscilla+Smith+and+carhart; see also
Posting of Michael Dorf to Dorf on Law blog, http://michaeldorf.org (May 6,
2007, 00:47 EST); see generally Postings by Jack Balkin to Balkanization blog,
http://balkin.blogspot.com/search?q=Carhart (April 18, 2007); id. (April 19,
2007); Posting by Marty Lederman to Balkanization blog, http://balkin.blogspot.
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written by Justice Kennedy as a misapplication and betrayal of
many of the principles of Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 167 I have
also argued that there is much in the opinion that reaffirms the
Casey framework.168 Carhart ―eliminates neither the core decisionmaking aspect of the right to abortion, nor the rule that a state may
not restrict access to abortions that are ‗necessary, in appropriate
medical judgment, for preservation of the life or health of the
mother.‘‖169 Doctrinally, the language of regret that starts this
essay is dicta brought on by what the court saw as a ban on one
gruesome and unnecessary medical procedure that had minimal if
any safety benefits and thus should have limited impact on future
cases. 170
To view the constitutional standard applied in Carhart this
way, one must see the opinion from the perspective of the Justice
in the majority who most limited the decision, presumably Justice
Kennedy, although potentially Chief Justice Roberts or Justice
Alito—something many pro-choice attorneys will find difficult.
From that perspective though, the Court‘s tortured interpretation of
the statute to ban only intact D&E abortions, 171 and to leave
untouched ―the vast majority of D&E abortions,‖172 as the basis for
its determination that the statute did not have the effect of
imposing a substantial obstacle to obtaining an abortion, becomes
an act that preserves second-trimester abortions. The justifications
for the Act—those the Court found were weighty enough to allow
a ban on a narrowly defined set of intact D&E procedures—would
com/search?q=Carhart (June 4, 2007, 00:35 EST); Posting by Andrew
Koppelman to Balkanization blog, http://balkin.blogspot.com/search?q=Carhart
(Apr. 23, 2007, 18:12 EST); Posting by Mark Graber to Balkanization blog,
http://balkin.blogspot.com/search?q=Carhart (May 4, 2007, 21:12 EST).
167
505 U.S. 833 (1992).
168
Priscilla J. Smith, Is the Glass Half-Full?: Gonzales v. Carhart and the
Future of Abortion Jurisprudence, 2 HARV. L. & POL‘Y REV. at 1 (Online)
(April 9, 2008), http://www.hlpronline.com.
169
Id. at 1–2.
170
Id.
171
Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1631 (―[I]nterpreting the Act so that it does not
prohibit standard D & E is the most reasonable reading and understanding of its
terms.‖).
172
Id. at 1632.
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not have been enough to allow a ban on ―the vast majority of D&E
abortions.‖173 If we take the Court at its word, that it is protecting
―standard D&E‖ procedures, Carhart does not impact the
decisional autonomy strand of the right.174
Similarly, the holding on the constitutional health requirement
in Carhart is limited to the Court‘s ―determination that there was
‗uncertainty over whether the barred procedure is ever necessary to
preserve a woman‘s health, given the availability of other abortion
procedures that are considered to be safe alternatives.‘‖175 Again,
seeing this as a limited decision requires one to view the holding
from the Court‘s skeptical perspective. The evidence in Carhart
may have cracked Justice Kennedy‘s absolute belief, as expressed
vehemently in dissent in Stenberg,176 that the intact D&E would
never provide anything other than ―minimal‖ health advantages;177
unfortunately for the plaintiffs, this was not enough for the Court.
The decision was ―based on what [the Court] saw as a failure of
proof, rather than an elimination of the underlying rule‖; it ―upheld
the Act because it held that the Act did not violate the health
requirement.‖178
173

Id.
See Smith, supra note 168, at 8.
175
Id. at 9 (quoting Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1638 (emphasis added)). The
Court has been rightly taken to task for its conclusion that there was
―uncertainty‖ over the safety benefits of the intact D&E and its undue crediting
of congressional ―facts‖ over the testimony of highly credentialed and
experienced medical experts for the plaintiffs and admissions by government
witnesses. See, e.g., Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1640 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting); Judith
Resnik, Courts and Democracy: The Production and Reproduction of
Constitutional Conflict, in THE COURTS AND THE MAKING OF PUBLIC POLICY
(The Foundation for Law, Justice and Society 2008), available at
http://www.fljs.org; Pamela S. Karlan, The Law of Small Numbers: Gonzales v.
Carhart, Parents Involved in Community Schools, and Some Themes From the
First Full Term of the Roberts Court, 86 N. Car. L. Rev. 1369, 1381–84 (2008).
176
Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 1014–16 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
177
Perhaps this is why the press reported after argument that ―Justice
Kennedy‘s questioning suggested that he . . . remained open to persuasion.‖
Linda Greenhouse, Justices Hear Argument on Late-Term Abortion, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 9, 2006, at A25.
178
Smith, supra note 168, at 9; Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1635 (―The
prohibition in the Act would be unconstitutional, under precedents we here
174
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As a doctrinal matter, the key to the different result reached in
Carhart was the Court‘s reversal of the burden of proof on the
question of whether a regulation subjects women to health risks. In
Stenberg, the Court recognized that ―a division of medical
opinion . . . at most means uncertainty, a factor that signals the
presence of risk, not its absence.‖ 179 Where a ―significant body of
medical opinion believes a procedure may bring with it greater
safety for some patients and explains the medical reasons
supporting that view,‖180 the burden of proof lay with the
government to prove that ―a health exception is ‗never necessary to
preserve the health of women.‘‖ 181 But in Carhart suddenly,
―uncertainty‖—the risk that the woman would be harmed—gave
the victory to the state, placing the burden on the woman to prove
harm. 182
While the case should have a limited impact on the
constitutional standard, 183 the decision is alarming because it
assume to be controlling, if it ‗subject[ed] [women] to significant health
risks.‘‖).
179
Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 937.
180
Id.
181
Id. at 937–38 (emphasis added).
182
Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1627.
183
Subsequent opinions from the Sixth and Fourth Circuit Courts of Appeal
support this view of Carhart’s impact. Both the Fourth and Sixth Circuits
carefully applied the Carhart Court‘s limited interpretation of the federal statute
to a subset of intact D&Es, those that physicians intended to perform at the
outset of the procedure. The Fourth Circuit, for example, noted that it was
critical to the Court‘s holding in Carhart that criminal liability does not attach
where ―a doctor . . . sets out to perform a standard D & E that by accident
becomes an intact D&E.‖ Richmond Med. Ctr. v. Herring, 527 F.3d 128, 131
(4th Cir. 2008); see also Northland Family Planning v. Cox, 487 F.3d 323, 336
(6th Cir. 2007) (striking Michigan statute applying ―when ‗any anatomical part‘
of the fetus passes the vaginal introitus,‖ calling the statute ―sweeping‖ and
―burdensome‖); id. (noting that ―Gonzales left undisturbed the holding from
Stenberg that a prohibition on D&E amounts to an undue burden on a woman‘s
right to terminate her pregnancy.‖). The Fourth Circuit also agreed that the
Carhart Court did not scrap the health requirement; rather, the failure of the
plaintiffs‘ health claim was based on a failure of proof. Richmond Med. Ctr.,
527 F.3d at 136 (noting that the Court viewed the issue as a ―contested factual
question‖) (citing Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1638); cf. Northland Family Planning,
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reveals an increasing discomfort with and distrust of the woman‘s
decision-making process. Though the Court retains the Casey
doctrinal framework, its application of the framework is feeble,
especially in its analysis of whether and how well the ban ―fits‖ the
asserted interest, and whether the means chosen by the state to
further the interest in potential life is ―calculated to inform the
woman‘s free choice, not hinder it.‖184
The Court‘s claim is that the ban conveys ―knowledge‖ that
will encourage some women to carry to term, reducing the overall
number of abortions after the first trimester. The Court appears to
argue that the ban conveys knowledge because it promotes ―a
dialogue‖ that will inform ―the political and legal systems, the
medical profession, expectant mothers, and society as a whole of
the consequences that follow from a decision to elect a late-term
abortion,‖185 and that that dialogue advances the ―State‘s interest in
respect for life‖ because it might in fact dissuade some women
from having second-trimester abortions. 186 Incredibly, the Court
confuses the political discourse that accompanied advocacy for and
against the ban in Congress and in the courts for the discourse
between patient and medical provider that will occur after the ban
is upheld. In the Court‘s attempt to shove the ban into the
―informed consent‖ framework of Planned Parenthood v. Casey, it
ignores that the ban conveys no ―knowledge‖ to the woman; it fails
to ―inform‖ her choice as Casey requires, and in fact shuts down
the dialogue a physician could otherwise have had with the patient
about how best to perform the abortion to preserve her health.187
In Carhart the aspect of abortion that serves the woman‘s
interest in the quality of mothering is gone. What is at stake is
―solely‖ the woman‘s physical safety and her decision not to
mother—neither of which the Court sees as impacted by the
federal ban. These interests are now pitted against what the Court
assumes will be the woman‘s horror if she comes to regret her
487 F.3d at 336 (noting ―it is unnecessary for us to address exceptions to an
unconstitutional and unenforceable general rule.‖).
184
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992).
185
Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1634.
186
Id.
187
Id.
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abortion and then finds out how the abortion was performed. 188
Completely lacking here is any sense of the woman making a
decision informed by her responsibility for mothering. 189 What is
left, in the Court‘s view, is a woman who made a bad decision
about the abortion itself, a decision she will come to regret. She is
at best uninformed and at worst duped by her physician about what
the procedure involves. The physician who performs the abortion
does so not for safety reasons, the Court claims, but for reasons of
―mere convenience.‖190 Thus, Carhart teaches that the pro-choice
movement‘s greatest vulnerability lies in the Court‘s view of how
and why women decide to have abortions. This view reflects the
idea promoted by anti-abortion activists191 that a woman‘s decision
to have an abortion can only be a result of exploitation by the
―abortion industry‖ or male predators of her natural weakness,192

188

Id. (―It is self-evident that a mother who comes to regret her choice to
abort must struggle with grief more anguished and sorrow more profound when
she learns, only after the event, what she once did not know: that she allowed a
doctor to pierce the skull and vacuum the fast-developing brain of her unborn
child, a child assuming the human form.‖).
189
In fact, the Court ignored evidence that removing the fetus intact in an
intact D&E is often desirable to families, especially those with wanted
pregnancies obtaining abortions because of fetal indications, because it offered
them the opportunity to hold their baby and say goodbye and gave the
physicians the opportunity to obtain evidence concerning the fetal abnormality.
Carhart v. Ashcroft, 331 F.Supp.2d 805, 904 (D. Neb. 2004) (quoting testimony
of Dr. Doe that ―‗these are pregnancies, generally, that were planned and very
much wanted, and the patient and family are going through a very stressful time
and frequently want the opportunity to say good-bye to the fetus, to be able to
hold it and examine it‘‖; noting that Dr. Doe testified that ―many patients
aborting wanted pregnancies for fetal anomalies wish to see, touch, and hold the
aborted fetus and cry, and say good-bye; some patients wish to have a burial or
memorial service‖), rev’d on other grounds sub nom, Gonzales v. Carhart, 127
S. Ct. 1610 (2007).
190
Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1638.
191
Reva Seigel has demonstrated that these depictions of women‘s
decision-making about abortions are being promoted by the anti-abortion
movement. See The Politics of Protection, supra note 6, at 992–93.
192
See Unfair Choice Posters, http://www.unfairchoice.info/posters.htm
(last visited Oct. 10, 2008) (promoting anti-abortion advertising campaigns with
posters that include text such as: ―[s]he believed the guy in the letter jacket who
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or of her betrayal of her natural feminine instincts—a betrayal that
denies women their only real source of love and self-esteem.193
IV. ―COVERING‖ VS. CONTROLLING MOTHERHOOD
In the preceding sections, we have seen that many women
choose abortions because they are concerned about, and feel
responsible for, how any children they bear will be cared for. By
giving women the freedom to decide when they will have children,
abortions allow women more control over the conditions in which
they care for children they already have or children they will bear
in the future.194 In turn, having the freedom to design the
conditions in which one‘s children are raised, whether one will be
sole caretaker, primary caretaker in a couple, secondary caretaker
in a couple, or whether one will share caretaker duties with a
partner also allows women to define the kind of mother they will
be and gives women more control over how they will model
parenting, and thus gender roles, to their sons and daughters. Thus,
abortion allows women the freedom to mother their children in
either traditional or non-traditional ways, and to seek equality in
their public and in their private lives.
We have also seen that the understanding that women have
abortions for these reasons, while more acceptable to the Court
than the view that women have abortions solely to avoid
motherhood, has largely receded from the Court‘s consciousness,
and seems to have lost salience in the pro-choice movement. Three
questions remain: (1) why has women‘s interest in deciding how to
said he loved her . . . and the guy in the white coat who said it‘s just a blob of
tissue‖; ―he picked up the tab . . . but she‘ll never stop paying for the abortion‖;
and, with a picture of a broken lamp lying on the ground, ―[l]ike most women
Mary didn‘t want an abortion . . . but her husband can be very persuasive‖).
193
See id. (posters including text such as: ―when her baby‘s heart stopped,
hers stopped too‖; ―you won‘t hear his mother cry, either,‖ with a photo of an
empty highchair; ―[w]hen she was 17, her mom told her the abortion would only
hurt for a little while . . . but 40 years, 2 sons and 3 grandkids later, it still hurts,‖
with photo of empty baby carriage; and ―21 years ago, Brian withdrew $300 and
drove his wife to the clinic . . . [o]ne house, two minivans and three kids later,
there‘s still no one who can fill these shoes‖, with photo of baby shoes).
194
See Section I, supra.
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care for their children been such a minor part of our cultural and
legal discussion of abortion; (2) how would emphasizing
motherhood impact efforts to increase protections for the right to
abortion; and (3) how should this aspect of the right be articulated?
A. Why We “Cover” Motherhood
A significant part of the answer to the first question lies in the
conflicting notions of motherhood in the feminist movement—its
meanings, its importance, its bonds and its bondage—a debate
about the dangers of asserting and the dangers of ceding
motherhood.195 Ultimately, in the process of trying to resist oldfashioned notions of motherhood, some of us have denied the
importance of motherhood to many women. This version of
feminist ―covering‖196 threatens to unravel feminism and
undermine one of its central goals—achieving equality in
parenting. I see three different conflicts that have led us down this
path.
First, some feminists have expressed concern that promoting
women‘s interests in motherhood in a movement to allow women
to avoid or control the terms of motherhood is counter-productive.
195

Concerns reflected in this debate reflect those in feminist debates over
―equality-versus-difference‖ approaches to sex inequality. As one scholar
described, ―both ‗focusing on and ignoring difference risk recreating it. This is
the dilemma of difference.‘‖ See Joan W. Scott, Deconstructing EqualityVersus-Difference: Or, the Uses of Poststructuralist Theory for Feminism, in
CONFLICTS IN FEMINISM 134, 139 (Marianne Hirsch & Evelyn Fox Keller, eds.,
Routledge, Chapman & Hall 1990) (quoting Martha Minow, Learning to Live
with the Dilemma of Difference: Bilingual and Special Education, 48 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBLEMS 157, 160 (1984)); see generally Martha Minow,
Adjudicating Differences: Conflicts Among Feminist Lawyers, in CONFLICTS IN
FEMINISM 149 (Marianne Hirsch & Evelyn Fox Keller, eds., Routledge,
Chapman & Hall 1990) (discussing conflicts between feminists on pregnancy
and maternity leave policies and on pornography, and noting that these ―fights
within the movement have been draining and, at times, disturbing‖).
196
See Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769, 772 (2002)
(―Covering means the underlying identity is neither altered nor hidden, but is
downplayed. [For example, c]overing occurs when a lesbian both is, and says
she is, a lesbian, but otherwise makes it easy for others to disattend her
orientation.‖).
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They argue that an emphasis on motherhood would support
essentialist arguments that undermine the rights of women who
choose not to bear and raise children. 197 As the movement
struggled to challenge existing stereotypes of women, advocates
avoided celebrating notions about the woman‘s role as mother,
fearing that ―by recognizing the desire to be a mother, one may
inadvertently strengthen or validate arguments that oppose
abortion and women‘s claims to control their fertility.‖ 198 If
women continue to be lauded, ―ennobled in the eyes of others‖ as
the plurality put it in Casey, for sacrificing themselves to
motherhood, women who chose not to be mothers would continue
to be considered selfish and even evil. Perhaps abortions would be
allowed for women who choose abortion because of their concerns
for their future children, but not for those who choose abortion
because they want no part of motherhood.
These are not trivial concerns. Anti-abortion advocates have
used traditional notions of motherhood successfully to restrict
abortion. For example, a South Dakota law already forces
physicians to tell a woman seeking an abortion that, among other
things, a pregnant woman has an ―existing relationship‖ with the
―unborn human being‖ which ―enjoys protection under the United
States Constitution and under the laws of South Dakota‖ and that

197

See generally Pamela Karlan and Daniel Ortiz, In a Diffident Voice:
Relational Feminism, Abortion Rights, and the Feminist Legal Agenda, 87 NW.
U. L. REV. 858, 871 (1993) (discussing debate).
198
Carol Sanger, M is for Many Things, 1 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN‘S
STUD. 15, 24 (1992). For example, while calling for feminists to ―acknowledg[e]
and [fully describe] the substantial room that motherhood takes up in women‘s
lives,‖ Carol Sanger describes dangers in the use of ―motherhood‖ imagery.
Motherhood, ―despite its capacity to overwhelm, [should] not be mistaken for
the whole show.‖ Id. at 31 (arguing that ―attempts at distilling all women into
mothers and all mothers into good ones are bound to be unreliable‖). Stories
about ―good‖ mothers, she pointed out, raise traditional notions of selfless
beings and cast those rejecting this traditional role in opposition, ―as wicked
creatures, usually characterized by some version of selfishness.‖ Id. at 36; see
also id. at 20–21 (describing avoidance of motherhood in curricula and
scholarship and arguing that ― [t]he identification of motherhood as a source of
subordination led early feminists to direct their energies toward creating social
structures less encumbered by maternal obligation‖).
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―by having an abortion, her existing relationship and her existing
constitutional rights with regards to that relationship will be
terminated.‖199 However, it is exactly the success of this antiabortion advocacy that demonstrates the cost of ceding discussions
of motherhood. Rather than preventing anti-abortion advocates
from using gender stereotypes against us, our failure to counter
anti-abortion advocates‘ images of motherhood has allowed them
to define the relationship between abortion and motherhood, and
indeed to define motherhood itself, in their image and not ours.200
Second, by avoiding an emphasis on women‘s interest in
motherhood, movement advocates avoid aggravating numerous
conflicts in our movement over the concept of motherhood.
Women seeking liberation and equality for the female gender are
not a uniform lot.201 There are those on whom motherhood has
been thrust and those whose motherhood has historically been
disparaged, discouraged, and often denied. 202 There are those who
199

H.B. 1166, codified at S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-10.1 (2008);
Robert Post, Informed Consent to Abortion: A First Amendment Analysis of
Physician Compelled Speech, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 939 (describing statute); see
also Sanger, supra note 198, at 36–37 (describing how mothers‘ interests were
―recast from noble to selfish,‖ in debates in the late 1980s over federal Family
and Medical Leave legislation).
200
See Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1634 (2007) (―While we find
no reliable data to measure the phenomenon, it seems unexceptionable to
conclude some women come to regret their choice to abort the infant life they
once created and sustained. Severe depression and loss of esteem can follow.);
REPORT OF THE SOUTH DAKOTA TASK FORCE TO STUDY ABORTION (2005)
(espousing view later expressed by the Supreme Court in Carhart), available at
http://www.voteyesforlife.com/docs/Task_Force_Report.pdf; see also H.B.
1233, 2005 Leg., 80th Sess. (S.D. 2005) (describing creation of legislative task
force to study and report on abortion).
201
See generally Teresa Lauretis, Upping the Anti (sic) in Feminist Theory,
in CONFLICTS IN FEMINISM 255 (Marianne Hirsch & Evelyn Fox Keller, eds.,
Routledge, Chapman & Hall 1990).
202
See, e.g., Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001) (challenge
to public hospital‘s policy of secretly searching urine of pregnant women for
cocaine use and reporting positive results to law enforcement); Kimani PaulEmile, The Charleston Policy: Substance or Abuse? 4 MICH. J. RACE & L. 325
(1999); Dorothy Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of
Color, Equality and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419 (1991).
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embrace and celebrate themselves as ―not-mother,‖ and those that
embrace the role of mother with a gooey selflessness. 203 There are
women who have sex with men, women who have sex with
women, and women who have sex with men and women. There
are feminists and there are ―womanists.‖204 There are womanists
who are also feminists and vice versa. There are women who are
not mothers and women who mother children they did not bear
themselves who must struggle to forge a new identity from the
―barren spinster‖ role that was assigned them in the past. And there
are those who enjoy privilege as the ―good mother.‖ There are
women from communities where women have always ―balanced‖
or juggled work and family; there are others for whom balancing
work and family is a new challenge. And there is everyone in
between.205
Some of these conflicts between conceptions of motherhood
play out in debates in the feminist movement over public policy.
For example, feminists argue about whether seeking benefits and
accommodations for caregiving will result in a regressive view of
women‘s roles or whether it is necessary if ―we want to improve
the situation of real women living in the real world, often in
poverty with real children.‖206

203

I confess that I have found myself in each category and between at
different times in my life.
204
See ALICE WALKER, IN SEARCH OF OUR MOTHERS‘ GARDENS:
WOMANIST PROSE (Harcourt Brace & Co. 2004). The concept of a ―womanist‖
was presented in Walker‘s In Search of Our Mother’s Gardens, and, as the
theologian Delores Williams noted, many other women have ―appropriated it as
a way of affirming themselves as black while simultaneously owning their
connection with feminism and with the Afro-American community, male and
female. The concept of womanist allows women to claim their roots in black
history, religion and culture.‖ Delores Williams, Womanist Theology: Black
Women’s Voices, CHRISTIANITY AND CRISIS (March 2, 1987), available at
http://www.religion-online.org/showarticle.asp?title=445.
205
See generally Minow, Adjudicating Differences, supra note 195, at 160
(―If feminists seek to challenge institutions that were designed without women
in mind, and social practices that subordinate women, the construction of a
feminist agenda must address all women.‖).
206
Mary Becker, Caring for Children and Caretakers, 76 CHI. KENT L.
REV. 1495, 1539 (2001) (citing Joan Williams, From Difference to Dominance
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In some quarters, there is an intergenerational conflict over
motherhood, similar to that described by Robin West between
traditionalist anti-Equal Rights Amendment women and those she
calls ―their ERA besotted daughters.‖207 This conflict plays out
between the ―ERA besotted‖ ones—second-wave feminists, those
from the movement taking place in the 1960s-70s—and their
daughters, some of whom consider themselves ―third-wave‖
feminists. 208 Some ―third wavers‖ extol the pleasures of
motherhood, sometimes in reaction to a real or perceived
denigration of motherhood by none other than their own
mothers. 209 Just as the ERA-besotted daughter ―define[d] herself
not just as ‗not you,‘ but against and in negation of her traditional
mother,‖210 so the third-waver feels her own mother‘s rejection of
motherhood as a rejection of herself. In an attempt not to repeat
to Domesticity: Care as Work, Gender as Tradition, 76 CHI. DENT L. REV. 1441,
1454–57 (2001)). Compare Katherine M. Franke, Theorizing Yes: An Essay on
Feminism, Law, and Desire, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 181, 183 (2001)
(―contend[ing] that first and second wave legal feminists who argued that
―women‘s participation in the wage labor market be compatible with our
responsibilities as mothers . . . tend[ed] to collapse women‘s identity into
motherhood‖); id. (arguing that ―issues of gender collapse quite quickly into the
normative significance of our roles as mothers‖ and that feminists should not
start with the ―centrality, presumption and inevitability of our responsibility for
children‖); id. at 197 (arguing that ―feminists must not ―abandon a concern for
the role of reproduction and mothering in women‘s lives‖), with Becker, supra,
at 1529 (calling Franke‘s argument simply ―nonsense.‖); id. at 1535 (arguing
that ―if most women are mothers, feminists should be pushing for changes to
improve the lives of women who are mothers,‖ which will require support for
the care movement).
207
Robin West, Constitutional Culture or Ordinary Politics: A Reply to
Reva Siegel, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1465, 1469 (2006).
208
See, e.g., Third Wave Foundation, http://www.thirdwavefoundation.org/
(last visited Oct. 10, 2008).
209
REBECCA WALKER, BABY LOVE: CHOOSING MOTHERHOOD AFTER A
LIFETIME OF AMBIVALENCE 8–9 (Riverhead Books 2007) (―[When I found out I
was pregnant,] I didn‘t know that the showdown between the ideas of my
mother‘s generation and my own was inescapable, and slated to play out
personally in our relationship. I didn‘t know that those fifteen years [that I had
been wanting a baby] constituted my real first trimester, and all that time my
baby was coming toward me, and I was moving toward my baby.‖).
210
West, supra note 207, at 1470.

S MITH

150

4/27/2009 7:44 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

this cycle of rejection in relation to her own offspring, she
embraces the role of mother and defines herself against her own
mother. The third-waver rejects stereotypes of motherhood and
believes she can find a way to embrace motherhood while asserting
and maintaining her own liberty and equality. 211 Her mother might
experience the daughter‘s embracing of motherhood as a rejection
of her own reasons (or excuses, depending on one‘s generational
point of view) for her unhappiness as mother and accuses the
daughter of being ungrateful. She also fears the daughter is naïve
and will lose everything feminists of the 1970s-80s have worked
for.212
Third, some, particularly Robin West, have argued that the
theoretical paradigms adopted in the Court‘s abortion
jurisprudence, and thus used by legal advocates to protect the right,
have themselves discouraged discussion of women‘s interests in
motherhood. As Professor West argued, the ―insularity of the
decision to abort accorded by the liberal notion of ‗right,‘ . . .
obfuscates the moral quality of most abortion decisions.‖ 213 There
211

A most dramatic example of this conflict can be found in the very public
exchanges between ―third-wave‖ feminist Rebecca Walker and her mother, the
famous writer and activist Alice Walker, described by Rebecca in her book and
articles. See BABY LOVE: CHOOSING MOTHERHOOD AFTER A LIFETIME OF
AMBIVALENCE, supra note 175; Rebecca Walker, How my mother’s fanatical
views tore us apart, (May 23, 2008), available at http://www.dailymail.co.uk/
femail/article-1021293/How-mothers-fanatical-feminist-views-tore-apartdaughter-The-Color-Purple-author.html; Rebecca Walker, Feminist Infighting
(March 1, 2008), available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rebeccawalker/feminist-infighting_b_89339.html.
212
See Jessica Valenti, The Sisterhood Split, THE NATION (March 6, 2008),
available at http://www.thenation.com/doc/20080324/valenti; Bridget Crawford,
Toward a Third-Wave Feminist Legal Theory: Young Women, Pornography and
the Praxis of Pleasure, 14 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 99, 167 (2007) (―Third-wave
feminism is largely a reactive critique that fails to advance its own positivistic
view of how its goals should be accomplished . . . . Third-wave feminists
respond to incomplete and distorted images of second-wave feminism. Their
indictment of second-wave feminism has led to a significant tension between
older and younger feminists, and division among young feminists themselves.‖).
213
Robin West, Taking Freedom Seriously, 104 HARV. L. REV. 43, 81
(1990). Similarly, Carol Sanger argued that ―because the right to abortion
developed within a framework of privacy that focused on a woman‘s right to
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are dangers in ―[c]eding motherhood . . . as an experience, a
symbol, and a virtue to the anti-abortion camp,‖ she argues; ―[b]y
insisting that the ‗right‘ to an abortion, like all rights, is not
contingent on the morality of the right-holder or the moral quality
of the conduct the right protects,‖ we may ―inadvertently
bolster . . . the pernicious and false claims that the decision to abort
is more often than not based on nothing more than a woman‘s
‗convenience.‘‖214
Indeed, one could see Carhart as the inevitable result of
protection of the right to abortion as a right that ―insulates both the
right-holder and the act that the right protects from the
community‘s scrutiny, judgment and understanding.‖215 While the
anti-abortion community has worked hard 216 to fill the moral
vacuum, we have been almost precluded from doing so by our
doctrine.217 The moral vacuum was then filled in by the dominant
culture, which in our case is one that does not believe that pregnant
women are equal to non-pregnant persons,218 and promotes the
control her trimestered body,‖ attention was diverted away from a ―woman‘s
interest in controlling her post-pregnant, child-now-out-of-body life.‖ As
abortion became a reproductive rather than a maternal issue, the very idea of
motherhood became antithetical to a prochoice position instead of its essence.
Sanger, supra note 198, at 23.
214
West, supra note 213, at 81–82; see also Sanger, supra note 198, at 23–
24 (arguing that ceding motherhood ―has had consequences for how we explore
(or do not explore) other issues relating to mothers‖).
215
West, supra note 213, at 81.
216
See, e.g., REPORT OF THE SOUTH DAKOTA T ASK FORCE TO STUDY
ABORTION (2005) (arguing that abortion harms women physically and mentally
by, inter alia, depriving them of their ―constitutionally protected‖ relationship
with the ―unborn child‖), available at http://www.voteyesforlife.com/docs/Task
_Force_Report.pdf.
217
In one district court oral argument, as I began to explain reasons women
obtain abortions in the second trimester, the judge politely stopped me and said,
―that is none of my business.‖ His job was not to question why, but to determine
whether the state had any business interfering.
218
See Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496 n.20 (1974) (―The
[challenged insurance] program divides potential recipients into two groupspregnant women and nonpregnant persons. While the first group is exclusively
female, the second includes members of both sexes.‖). But see Reva Siegel,
You’ve Come a Long Way, Baby: Rehnquist’s New Approach to Pregnancy
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idea that the decision to abort is based only on a woman‘s
convenience.
On the other hand, as West allows, the alternative of resting
reproductive freedom ―on the demonstrated capacity of pregnant
women to decide whether to carry a fetus to term or to abort
responsibly,‖ would allow the dominant culture‘s view of women
to control just as readily, if not more so, than in a rights mode.
Such a ―responsible woman‖ standard invites scrutiny of each
woman‘s decision for compliance with some sort of responsibilitybased moral code219 which, in the current world, is likely to be
―badly tainted‖ by bias of misogynist and racist perceptions of
women. 220 Indeed, one could also read Carhart as foreshadowing
the result of resting reproductive freedom on the majority‘s view of
women‘s ―moral responsibility.‖ What would the result have been,
after all, if there was no ―right‖ at all? Either the statute would
have gone into effect without any limiting construction and doctors
would have been unable to provide second-trimester abortions at
all or, in the perfect world newly informed by arguments about
women‘s moral reasoning, the statute would never have been
enacted in the first place.
B. Emphasizing the Aspects of Abortion that Serve Motherhood
Resuscitating and emphasizing the argument that abortion
serves women‘s interest in motherhood has at least two
Discrimination in Hibbs, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1871, 1873–74 (2006) (arguing that
―Hibbs is the first Supreme Court opinion to recognize that laws regulating
pregnant women can enforce unconstitutional sex stereotypes, and so introduces
an important new understanding of when discrimination on the basis of
pregnancy is discrimination on the basis of sex under Geduldig v. Aeillo.‖); id. at
1873 (―I am prepared to treat Rehnquist‘s change in perspective as the
nation‘s.‖); Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721
(2003).
219
I can imagine, for example, the imposition of a kind of judicial bypass
procedure for adult women, where judges would decide whether the woman‘s
decision was responsible ―enough.‖
220
West, supra note 213, at 83; see also Pamela Karlan & Daniel Ortiz, In
a Diffident Voice: Relational Feminism, Abortion Rights, and the Feminist Legal
Agenda, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 858, 871 (1993).
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advantages. First, not only should this emphasis increase the
weight of the woman‘s interest in abortion as against the state‘s
interest in limiting it in the constitutional equation, it also provides
additional arguments for the protection of the right itself. I discuss
this more in the section that follows. 221
Second, stressing this argument should increase public support
for and understanding of abortion. In making this argument, I
respond to Robin West‘s call for ―Liberals and feminists [to]
develop alternative, public-regarding arguments supporting
[reproductive rights] and the liberty they protect that transcend the
circular and increasingly false insistence that they simply exist.‖222
Given the high percentage of women who have an abortion in their
lifetimes or who are close to a woman who has an abortion, this
aspect of the abortion decision-making process is likely to resonate
with women in the United States, and stressing it will make
abortion patients more recognizable to themselves and to the
public. In fact, it is likely that one reason many women do not see
themselves in the public image of an abortion patient is because
women obtaining abortions are not portrayed in a way that they
recognize. 223
Moreover, this argument may be comforting to those who, like
Justice Kennedy, still hold on to some old-fashioned notions of
pregnancy, motherhood, and gender roles. As David Cohen has
demonstrated, Justice Kennedy‘s jurisprudence in cases addressing
―the parent-child relationship‖ relies on ―traditional and
paternalistic gender stereotypes about nontraditional fathers, [and]
idealized mothers.‖224 At least as long as Justice Kennedy remains

221

See infra at Section IV.C.
See West, supra note 213, at 84.
223
Perhaps this is why, as has been reported by many an abortion provider,
so many patients can say, ―I believe abortion is murder, but in my case, it‘s
different.‖ See e.g., WICKLUND, supra note 24, at 178–84; Cornelia Dean,
Telling the Stories Behind the Abortions, N.Y. TIMES, Nov 6, 2007, at F5.
Women are making the decision themselves for reasons they view as
responsible, caring reasons about children they would otherwise bear, reasons
that are different from the reasons they are told others obtain abortions.
224
David Cohen, Justice Kennedy’s Gendered World, 59 S.C. L. REV. 673,
688–90 (2008) (evaluating Justice Kennedy‘s votes and opinions in sex222
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at the Court‘s center, pro-choice advocates should demonstrate
how abortion serves both the women‘s interest in the importance of
motherhood, and in how she will care for any child she would
otherwise bear, as well as the woman‘s interest in whether she will
bear a child at all. By making these arguments, pro-choice
advocates will not appeal to those who believe that motherhood is
women‘s only true calling.225 However, they will appeal to those
who believe that women should be able to seek fulfillment outside
the home, who accept that abortion is necessary, but who are
comforted by the reality that many women still view caring for
children as an integral part of their lives.
C. Articulating How Abortion Serves Motherhood in a Rights
Framework
The final question then is whether we can reflect the realities of
women seeking abortions in a way that reveals the moral quality of
their decisions and appeals to a sense of ―responsibility,‖ but
continue to make our arguments in a rights-based model, be it a
liberty, privacy, equality, dignity or human right. I reject the idea
that a rights-based model and a model infused with notions of
responsibility are mutually exclusive; after all, we already have a
rights-based model infused with notions of irresponsibility. It
seems entirely reasonable to articulate that the rights of liberty and
equality do not just mean freedom from family but also freedom in
family, and to chart abortion‘s role in family as well as in avoiding
discrimination cases and arguing that in those ―sex-discrimination cases
involving the parent-child relationship, Justice Kennedy relies on traditional and
paternalistic gender stereotypes about nontraditional fathers, idealized mothers,
and second-guessing women‘s decisions‖).
225
See, e.g., Allan Carlson, Paul Mero, The Natural Family: A Manifesto,
in 19 THE FAMILY IN AMERICA 1 (March 2005) (―[W]omen and men are equal in
dignity and innate human rights, but different in function. Even if sometimes
thwarted by events beyond the individual‘s control (or sometimes given up for a
religious vocation), the calling of each boy is to become husband and father; the
calling of each girl is to become wife and mother.‖); see also Reva Siegel, The
New Politics of Abortion: An Equality Analysis of Woman-Protective Abortion
Restrictions, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 991, 1002–06 (2007) (hereinafter ―New
Politics”) (summarizing the manifesto and describing its origins).
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family. We are, after all, in the lucky position of telling the truth
about abortion.
Framing women‘s decisions to obtain abortions in reference to
their views of the importance of motherhood in both litigation and
in legislative advocacy does this, and should do it without pitting
one woman against another, as long as the decisions of women
who choose abortions in all different circumstances are
described—the decisions of women who are mothers, women who
want to be mothers at some point but not now, and also those who
do not want to be mothers at all, and whose ―life‘s work‖ 226 is
located elsewhere entirely.
Appealing to concerns for motherhood will strengthen the right
to abortion by adding the woman‘s right to control how she will
parent to the list of aspects of our rights to liberty and equality that
abortion serves. 227 Abortion in this view is a positive and essential
means for the creation of a happy citizenry, a tool which along
with contraception helps women protect their health and lives,
control their own futures, and, when they choose to raise children,
to raise them in the best circumstances they can. This aspect of the
right to abortion, the aspect that serves women‘s interest in
motherhood, should be protected by the right to control how one‘s
children are raised, a right clearly embraced by the Court as a
liberty right.228
Moreover, placing women‘s control over motherhood front and
center in our demand for abortion should also strengthen a right to
abortion based in the right to equal protection of the laws. As
others have argued, 229 abortion restrictions that enforce, or are

226

See Vicki Schultz, Life’s Work, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1888 (2000)
(developing a vision of social justice).
227
See supra notes 6–8.
228
See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 536 (1925) (enforcing
due process liberty right of parents ―to direct the upbringing and education of
[their] children‖); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (due process
liberty guarantee includes right to ―establish a home and bring up children‖).
229
As Reva Siegel has argued, under Casey the courts should examine a
state‘s interest in a given regulation to insure that it is not merely a guise
through which to enforce the ―state‘s vision of the woman‘s role.‖ See Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992); see also Siegel, Sex Equality,
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justified by reference to, gender stereotyped notions of motherhood
violate notions of sex equality under either the equal protection
clause,230 the equal right to liberty recognized in Thornburgh,231 or
Casey’s rejection of the State‘s right to insist ―upon its own vision
of the woman‘s role, however dominant that vision has been in the
course of our history and culture.‖232 While many have argued that
an equality analysis provides a stronger doctrinal basis for the right
to abortion than the privacy right grounded in liberty in Roe,233 and
although such an analysis has already seeped into abortion
jurisprudence, the availability of the doctrine has done nothing to
increase protections yet. Rather than following Casey, the Court
turned its back on Casey’s admonition that the state cannot insist
―upon its own vision of the woman‘s role,‖ and ignored Casey’s
improper purpose rule which demanded more of an analysis of the

supra note 9, at 815–16 (―Whatever sex role differences in intimate and family
relations custom may engender, government may not entrench or aggravate
these role differences by using law to restrict women‘s bodily autonomy and life
opportunities in virtue of their sexual or parenting relations in ways that
government does not restrict men‘s.‖); id. at 823–24 (noting that this argument
was presented by amici in Roe).
230
See, e.g., New Politics, supra note 225, at 991–92 (―argu[ing] that the
equal protection cases that prohibit state action enforcing sex stereotypes
prohibit laws enforcing [stereotyped views of] motherhood.‖); Siegel, Sex
Equality, supra note 12, at 816 (describing sources claiming doctrinal support
for reproductive rights in the 14th Amendment‘s due process clause, the equal
protection clause, privileges and immunities and the 13th and 19th
Amendments).
231
Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476
U.S. 747, 772 (1986) (noting that the promise of liberty is extended to ―women
as well as to men‖); id. (acknowledging that the central sphere of liberty is
―guarantee[d] equally to all.‖); see also Siegel, Sex Equality, supra note 9, at
831–32 (discussing Court‘s development of an equality analysis in the liberty
right); id. at 831–34 (discussing Tuscon Women’s Clinic v. Eden, 379 F.3d 531,
548 (9th Cir. 2004)).
232
Casey, 505 U.S. at 852. See also Siegel, Sex Equality, supra note 9, at
834 (―Courts can enforce equal citizenship values by evaluating restrictions on
reproductive decision making to ensure that such restrictions do not reflect or
enforce gender stereotypes about women‘s agency or their sexual and family
roles.‖).
233
Id.
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potentially discriminatory motives behind state regulations. The
Carhart Court actually relied on a rationale that resuscitates
gender-stereotyped notions of women‘s role in the family and a
paternalistic view of the necessity of abortion regulation, 234 an
unconstitutional rationale whose purpose is to impose a burden on
women that is undue. 235
In fact, the way that sex equality notions have been ushered
into abortion jurisprudence with an emphasis on equality in the
labor force236 has focused the Court on a decision it is
uncomfortable with—a decision to have an abortion so one can be
equal in the workplace. As Reva Siegel warned in 1992:
So long as accounts of the abortion decision exempt men
and society at large from their responsibility for shaping the
conditions under which women conceive, bear, and rear
children, it is only the woman seeking an abortion who
appears to attach negative value to pregnancy. In these
circumstances, her decision to seek an abortion will appear
to reflect traits of the feminine character—be it frail,
overwrought, selfish, or capricious. 237
When the decision is so ―fraught‖ and potentially faulty, the Court
is likely to tolerate more ―burden‖ on the woman than it would
tolerate on men.
This may be just another way of saying that the equality
argument will not prevail until the Court views pregnant women as

234

Interestingly, the argument that intact D&E procedures were harmful to
women was not made by the government in the course of litigation. See
Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1641 (2007).
235
See Siegel, New Politics, supra note 225, at 999 (“If separate spheres
views of women‘s roles played a motivating part in the enactment of abortion
restrictions, the abortion restrictions violate‖ equality guarantees.); id. at 1040–
43.
236
In Casey, the Court finally explicitly acknowledged that abortion serves
women‘s interests in achieving social and economic equality, pronouncing that
―[t]he ability of women to participate equally in the economic and social life of
the Nation has been facilitated by their ability to control their reproductive
lives.‖ 505 U.S. at 856 (citation omitted).
237
Siegal, Reasoning, supra note 9, at 274 n.49.
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truly equal. 238 Where the Court views the pregnant woman‘s
―bonds of love‖ for her child as an ultimate expression of respect
for human life, an argument that the Constitution protects a
pregnant woman‘s liberty to reject this relationship, or her equality
right not to have the relationship foisted upon her, will be viewed
with skepticism, confusion, pity, and ultimately a desire to protect,
as it was in Carhart. The Court‘s approach to these cases, unless
the woman is the most sympathetic—a rape or incest victim
perhaps, or a woman whose condition is life threatening beyond a
shadow of a doubt thus rendering her decision more apparently
sound239—will likely remain the same, employing a shoddy ―fit‖
analysis if it applies one at all. A claim, even one revealing that a
given restriction was designed to impose traditional stereotyped
roles on women, will not prevail without or a radical change in our
cultural views of gender roles, 240 or a different focus to the equality
argument such as that I am proposing here, no matter whether
grounded in liberty, equal protection, dignity, human rights, or
238

Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496 n.20 (1974) (―The [challenged
insurance] program divides potential recipients into two groups-pregnant women
and nonpregnant persons. While the first group is exclusively female, the second
includes members of both sexes.‖); see also, e.g., Reasoning, supra note 9, at
275 (citing Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 496 n.20 and arguing that Court would
continue to see the pregnant woman as ―inherently different‖ from Geduldig’s
―nonpregnant persons‖ as long as it considered the pregnant woman ―from what
it conceives to be a strictly physiological standpoint.‖); id. at 277 (Abortionrestrictive regulation is sex-based regulation, the use of public power to force
women to bear children. Yet, the Court has never described the state‘s interest in
protecting potential life as an interest in forcing women to bear children.‖).
239
Cf. Amy Goldstein, Ailing Woman Becomes Abortion Symbol: Both
Sides Take up the Case of Michelle Lee, Whose Heart Problems Make
Pregnancy Dangerous, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE Oct. 25, 1998, at A11
(reporting that doctors in a Louisiana public hospital where abortions are
allowed only where pregnancy is life-threatening, denied abortion to pregnant
woman with serious heart condition whose chance of dying was not greater than
50 percent).
240
See Siegel, Reasoning, supra note 9, at 360 (―Although the separate
spheres tradition no longer receives official public sanction, the sex-role
concepts it fostered continue to play a crucial part in the abortion controversy,
supplying norms of sexual and maternal comportment for women that inform
public judgments about the propriety of abortion.‖).
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even the Ninth Amendment.241
Finally, the Court should also protect the right as a hybrid
equal right of liberty based on its holdings in Meyer and Pierce on
the one hand242 and Eisenstadt v. Baird243 on the other. As Kim
Buchanan has argued with respect to one‘s right to sexual liberty,
men and women have ―equal due process interests in deciding how
to‖ control the raising of their children;244 Eisenstadt stands for the
proposition that ―whatever the scope and nature‖ of the due
process liberty right to raise one‘s children, ―equal protection
requires that women must enjoy it equally with men.‖ 245
Restrictions on abortion that prevent women from controlling these
conditions are therefore unconstitutional for this reason as well.
CONCLUSION
Carhart marks an important moment for the movement not just
for access to abortion, but also for women‘s liberation generally.
241

Many scholars have argued that the right to abortion, again like the
rights of gay men and lesbians, should be articulated as some version of a
―hybrid‖ constitutional right—one that connects our Constitution‘s liberty and
equality values. See citations in note 9 supra. Reva Siegel has carried the
analysis further within the reproductive rights arena both by revealing the
existence of a hybrid analysis already employed by the Court to recognize
constitutional protections for notions of ―dignity‖ that included both liberty and
equality elements, and applying that dignity framework to a review of the dicta
in Carhart used to justify the regulations approved in that case. Siegel, The
Politics of Protection, supra note 6.
242
See supra note 161.
243
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
244
Kim Shayo Buchanan, Lawrence v. Geduldig: Regulating Women’s
Sexuality, 56 EMORY L.J. 1235, 1238, 1294-1302 (2007); see also Sex Equality,
supra note 9, at 831–32 (discussing Court‘s development of an equality analysis
in the liberty right); Thornburgh, 476 U.S. 747, 772 (1986) (declaring that: (1)
the Constitution promises an equal guarantee of liberty to ―women as well as
men‖ and (2) the woman‘s decision whether to end her pregnancy is among the
most ―basic to individual dignity and autonomy‖ of all the decisions protected
by this equal right to liberty and thus is ―fundamental.‖).
245
Id. at 1237 & n.11 (citing Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453 (―[W]hatever the
rights of the individual to access contraceptives may be, the rights must be the
same for the unmarried and the married alike.‖)).

S MITH

160

4/27/2009 7:44 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

Since Roe, the sense that abortion serves women‘s interests in
liberty and equality in the family, as well as in civic life, has been
decreasing. The Carhart Court‘s decision has finally turned
motherhood against us explicitly, and speaks about our ―bonds of
love‖ as if we needed to be reminded of them, as if in straying so
far from home we have lost touch with love itself. This insult lays
down the gauntlet. It is time we respond to take up the challenge,
to reclaim motherhood in our own image. Emphasizing that
abortion serves women‘s interest in motherhood will benefit the
movement for reproductive freedom whether our courts become
more liberal or more conservative, and will promote a fuller
understanding of the role abortion plays in women‘s lives.
The question is whether we are strong enough as a movement
to protect our right to celebrate maternity without regressing into
―maternal essentialism,‖ that is, ―the belief that the real, true
‗whatness‘ of women is motherhood.‖246 Can we do this without
giving up our right to decide how to use our ―generative
potential,‖247 and while claiming our right to decide this in part on
behalf of our own children‘s wellbeing? The women who rely on
abortion or the possibility of obtaining an abortion deserve to be
described by us in a way that is recognizable to them. If we do not
take up this challenge, I fear they will no longer be able to rely on
the right at all.
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